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SUMMARY
Robotics is now being applied to a diversity of real-world applications [1] and in
many areas such as industrial, medical, and mobile robotics, safety is a critical consid-
eration for continued adoption. In this thesis we therefore investigate how to develop
algorithms that improve the safety of autonomous systems using both a model-based
and model-free framework. To begin, we make a variety of assumptions (e.g., that
a model is known, there is a single safety constraint, there are no communication
limits, and that the state can be sensed everywhere), and show how to guarantee the
safety of the system. The contribution of the initial approach is a generalization of
an existing method for creating a barrier function, which is a function similar to a
Lyapunov function that can be used to make safety guarantees. We then investigate
relaxing these initial assumptions. In some cases, new additional assumptions are
required, performance may be reduced, or safety guarantees may no longer be avail-
able. We motivate the thesis with collision avoidance for fixed wing aircraft which
can be viewed as a pairwise constraint on each pair of aircraft. This introduces the
need for considering multiple safety factors simultaneously, and we show that an ad-
ditional assumption is needed in this case. We then relax the assumption that the
vehicles have unlimited communication and find that safety can still be guaranteed.
However, it is possible in this case that the overriding safety controller may be more
invasive than if more communication is allowed. When we then further relax the
assumption that the state can be sensed at all times, safety can still be guaranteed
in some specified situations but the system may be more permissive in approaching
safety boundaries. We finally remove the assumption of a known model for dynamics.
Although removing this assumption means the system is no longer guaranteed to be
safe, the benefit is that it allows a safety designer to build a far less invasive override





Model-based engineering, where an environment or dynamics model is used to de-
rive properties of a system, is responsible for a myriad of control systems, such as the
Bernoulli equation that enables modern flight [2], to Lyapunov functions for humanoid
robots [3], to barrier functions for safety [4]. These properties are often critical for
real world operation as stability guarantees are important for predictable operations,
derived convergence rates enable cost effective manufacturing plants, robustness re-
sults allow for robots to operate in a real world that consists of unmodelled effects,
and safety guarantees are critical for systems interacting with humans.
Nevertheless, there can be limitations to model-based approaches. One exam-
ple is a model mismatch where it may be necessary to assume a simplified model
relative to the real system in order to derive properties. An example is where a
unicycle model is assumed for fixed-wing aircraft collision avoidance [5, 6, 7] where
closed form solutions are difficult to derive for more complicated 6 degree of freedom
models. This can lead to differences between the predicted performance and actual
performance on a live system. A second example of a limitation of a model-based
approach can be performance. In computer vision, deep learning frameworks have
risen in popularity as their performance has out-performed model-based methods [8].
Similarly, reinforcement learning, where an agent interacts with an environment and
tries to maximize reward is another area where model free approaches can outperform
model-based counterparts [9] and have led to human level performance in Atari [10],
Starcraft [11], and Dota II [12].
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Thus, there are tradeoffs to using model-based and model-free approaches. The
former are more applicable when the system is well understood and the ability to
predict system behavior is critical. The latter may be more applicable when the
system is extremely complicated and final performance is important. Nevertheless,
there have been a variety of approaches to combine these methods. For instance, in
[9] the authors start with a model based controller and transition to a model free
method at the end of training. The initial model allows the system to learn faster at
the beginning but the final model free approach improves final performance. Other
approaches have learned an environment model to then train an agent in reinforcement
learning as this can improve robustness of the final result [13, 14]. Alternatively, in
[15] there are two neural networks for a learned forward propagation model and
model-free learning, respectively. A final action selection layer then uses these two
networks.
Model based methods can also explicitly guide the trajectory of a learning agent.
For instance, in [16], the authors learn the dynamics, value function, and safety model
from a set of demonstration trajectories. They then apply model predictive control
using these functions under the constraint that the planned path ends with sufficient
probability in a known safe state. In [17] the authors use temporal logic to create
an overriding controller that assigns a reward when there is a mismatch between the
reinforcement learning and safety system. A similar idea is pursued in [18] where an
overriding controller keeps the state in an admissible set and adds a cost for unsafe
actions in order for the reinforcement learning system to also account for safety in its
reward function.
For systems where safety is an important consideration, an override of a model
free system can be pursued. For instance, in [19] a discrimination function is trained
to mimic a human blocking action. Similarly, in [20] the authors train a reset policy to
take a series of actions to get the agent back to safe initial conditions and is activated
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when the reset policy value function gets below a threshold. Finally, in [21] it is shown
that while blockers are effective at avoiding unsafe conditions, the use of a blocker
can also be overly conservative, resulting in impaired overall performance.
This thesis investigates both model-based and model-free approaches to safety
with a motivating example of fixed-wing collision avoidance, an application of increas-
ing importance. As low-cost, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) find civilian uses, the
low-altitude airspace is increasingly congested, leading to large-scale UAV operation
limitations including concerns for privacy, the environment, national security, and
safe-flight validation [22]. A key challenge for safe-flight validation in congested envi-
ronments is ensuring collision avoidance while enabling vehicles to accomplish their
designed missions. Thus, in this thesis we propose an algorithm that minimally alters
a vehicle’s nominal control input while still ensuring safe operations.
A variety of approaches to fixed-wing collision avoidance have been proposed.
Partially observable Markov decision processes are used in [23, 24] to achieve safe
flight distances. Velocity obstacles [25] provide a geometric framework for selecting
safe velocities. The dynamic window approach, originally introduced in [26] for static
obstacles and adapted to moving obstacles in [27], uses circular arcs for trajectories
and limits the set of allowable velocities to enable a quick optimization of the con-
trol input. In [5], the authors develop a first-order look-ahead algorithm that can be
applied to vehicles with unicycle dynamics in a decentralized way while guaranteeing
that collisions amongst k vehicles are avoided. Potential functions [28, 6] have also
been applied to fixed-wing collision avoidance, where it can be shown that vehicles
can safely avoid each other even when their sensing range is limited. Similarly, [7]
discusses how to combine potential functions with trajectory goals into a navigation
function in order to provide criteria under which collision avoidance can be guaran-
teed. Navigation functions have also been combined with Model Predictive Control
(MPC) by making inter-agent distance requirements implicit in the cost function [29].
3
MPC has additionally been applied to UAV collision avoidance for vehicles with lim-
ited sensing [30] and communication constraints [31]. While MPC provides a flexible
framework for distributed collision avoidance, its limited horizon can make safety
guarantees difficult. In a more general case, the optimal control formulation in [32]
allows for collision avoidance guarantees, but it is computationally intensive as it
requires numerically solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations over an infinite
horizon.
Trajectory generation was analyzed in [33] where a nonlinear program is devel-
oped to find a safe reference trajectory constructed from polynomials. In [34] and
[35], the authors discuss trajectory generation using a randomly exploring random
tree (RRT) with dynamics constraints provided by Dubins paths and a waypoint
generation algorithm, respectively. Reference governors [36], where the input refer-
ence signal for a nominal closed loop controller is overridden in order to ensure that
safety and performance constraints are maintained, have also been applied to colli-
sion avoidance in [37]. In [37] the authors show how to ensure collision avoidance
for a distributed set of linear systems via a sequential mixed-integer programming
optimization. The approach considers a finite horizon in the optimization because it
is shown that a constant reference can then keep the system safe after that point.
Reference governors are similar to the approach of this thesis in that given a nominal
controller the approach seeks a minimal adjustment in order to improve safety char-
acteristics. However, they differ in how the minimal adjustment occurs. A reference
governor adjusts the set point that a nominal system is designed to achieve. On
the other hand, the approach of this thesis does not require a reference input to the
nominal system and instead allows a nominal controller to calculate a control input
as it normally would. Finally, in [38], the authors also consider a trajectory based
approach to avoid static obstacles. Similar to evasive maneuvers, traffic rules [39,
40] are a method for encoding hybrid behaviors that can include collision avoidance
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trajectories. In [39], the authors show that a two vehicle system with limited sensing
range can avoid collisions while reaching position goals. While in general this may
result in conservative behaviors, they demonstrate in simulation that the decentral-
ized algorithm continues to allow vehicles to reach their target configuration while
avoiding collisions for as many as 70 vehicles. Reactive methods are useful because
they can often be calculated online while evasive maneuvers benefit from a lookahead
into the future. In this thesis we leverage the merits of both approaches within the
framework of control barrier functions.
Motivated by the importance of formal guarantees of collision avoidance that
are computationally feasible and minimally invasive we discuss in this thesis how to
apply barrier functions (e.g., [41], [4]) to the UAV collision avoidance problem, where
the system is subject to actuator constraints, nonlinear dynamics, and nonlinear
safety constraints. Barrier functions are similar to Lyapunov functions and allow for
guarantees that a system will stay safe (i.e., vehicles will maintain safe distances from
each other) for all future times. Further, under some assumptions detailed later, a
Quadratic Program (QP) can be used to calculate a safe control input implied by
a barrier function so that the calculation can be done online [4]. Given such safety
guarantees, barrier functions have been applied to a set of problems including collision
avoidance for autonomous agents ([42, 43]), bipedal robots ([3, 44]), adaptive cruise
control and lane following ([45, 4, 46, 47]), and in mobile communication networks
[48].
However, barrier functions rely on being able to find a function with particular
properties for safety to be guaranteed. For systems like a fixed wing UAV with
actuator constraints, nonlinear dynamics, and nonlinear safety constraints, generating
such a function can be difficult. In this respect they are similar to Lyapunov functions.
They provide guarantees when a system designer can find appropriate functions but
they may be difficult to construct.
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Nevertheless, there are a variety of approaches to finding a barrier function given
a system and safety constraints. One approach discussed for instance in ([45, 49,
41, 50]), uses a sum of squares decomposition [51]. In this approach an initially
conservative estimate for a barrier function is found and the associated safe set is
iteratively enlarged. Iterative approaches have also been developed when the system
has relative degree greater than one. The conditions for calculating a safe control
input for higher order systems are given in [52]. In [44], a backstepping approach is
developed that ensures a control barrier function can be constructed and a similar
approach is discussed in [53]. The approach discussed in this thesis is most similar to
[54] where a barrier function is formulated by calculating the distance to a backup set
after applying a backup controller. In this thesis we develop an alternative approach
that does not require the specification of a backup set.
Geometric insights have also been exploited in [3], where the authors develop
a barrier function for precise foot placement by ensuring that the foot is within the
intersection of two circles. Similarly, in [42, 43], the authors develop a barrier function
that ensures a circle and ellipsoid, respectively, around each robot will not overlap in
order to ensure there will be no collisions for double integrator and quadrotor robots,
respectively. Barrier functions have also been developed for unicycle dynamics in
[47], where the dynamics are simplified by considering a point slightly in front of the
vehicle.
Previous work on barrier functions has shown how, given the current state, a safe
control input can be selected to ensure the system is safe for all times. In this paper,
we also ensure system safety but do so by integrating the dynamics into the future
using a known evasive maneuver that is always available to keep the system safe. In
this respect the system is more predictable since it is known that a particular control
input will be safe. Further, we ensure that actuator limits are respected which is a
significant constraint in the case of UAVs where the system has non-zero minimum
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velocity.
Aside from ensuring a barrier function constraint can be satisfied given actua-
tor limitations, UAV collision avoidance also motivates the consideration of multiple
safety constraints that must be satisfied at all times. In particular, because collision
avoidance can be viewed as a constraint for each pairwise combination of vehicles [48,
55], we briefly review how barrier functions have been applied to systems with multiple
constraints. A contract-based approach is presented in [45]. A sum of squares de-
composition is presented in [50] where additional safety constraints map to additional
constraints in the optimization problem. In [53], necessary and sufficient conditions
are given for the existence of a control input that satisfies multiple barrier function
constraints. The approach generalizes to high order and time-varying systems but
requires that actuator constraints be unbounded. Barrier function composition has
also been addressed in [45, 48, 55]. In [45], the authors partition the state space into
regions for which a single barrier function is active in each component of the parti-
tion. In [48] and [55] non-smooth barrier functions are discussed, where the result
allows for combining barrier functions using boolean primitives. One drawback of the
boolean composition approaches is that it is not guaranteed that the composition of
barrier functions will result in a barrier function.
Barrier functions have also been used in the context of limited sensing [42, 56, 57,
45] and allow for safety guarantees so that when the system starts safe it will remain
safe for all future time. In [42] the authors provide a minimum sensing radius to
ensure a system of double integrator robots maintain safe distances from each other.
Further, they reformulate a Quadratic Program (QP) that only requires knowing the
relative position to other agents while still ensuring safety for both collaborative and
non-collaborative neighbors. In [56], the authors provide a decentralized strategy
for collision avoidance that does not require knowing neighbor barrier function pa-
rameters. While [57] does not address multi-agent systems, it does consider collision
7
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Figure 1.1: A simple system with a car that travels along the line. A safety override
system should prevent the car from traveling towards the wall at high speed when it
is close to the wall but can be more permissive when the car is far from the wall.
avoidance under limited range sensing for 3D quadrotors. The authors design a se-
quential QP that translates position-based constraints into rotational commands to
ensure safety. Sensing limitations can also be addressed with a disturbance to the
system dynamics. For instance, in [45] the authors model road curvature changes as
a bounded disturbance to apply barrier functions to adaptive cruise control and lane
keeping.
1.2 Barrier Functions Background
In this section we discuss how to generate a barrier function that ensures a system
will stay safe for all future times. To motivate the discussion, consider the example in
Figure 1.1 where a car has been designed to move along the x-axis in order to transport
people. The car’s controller applies acceleration commands to achieve speed set points
and eventually slows down as it gets to the correct location. While it may seem better
to design the car controller to achieve speed and safety goals simultaneously, this
can significantly complicate controller design, particularly as dynamics, performance
goals, or safety objectives become more complicated. For this reason, it may be that
the car’s controller may not be designed with safety goals in mind, like not hitting
the wall shown in the figure.
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Consider then how to design a safety system that, given the car’s original con-
troller, can allow the system to achieve its performance goal (get to a specific location
on the x-axis) while not sacrificing the safety goal (do not hit the wall). Clearly, if
the car is very close to the wall, the safety system should only allow the car to remain
in place or move to the right. On the other hand, if the car is extremely far from
the wall, the safety override can be very permissive because even if the car is mov-
ing very quickly towards the wall, there is still a substantial amount of time to slow
down and avoid a collision. In between these two extremes, the safety override might
try to balance allowing the car to approach the wall somewhat but not very quickly.
In other words, it is not just how close to the wall the car is but how quickly it is
approaching it that matters when considering how invasive a safety override should
be.
A barrier function is a function that allows the system’s safety designer to make
this type of tradeoff precise. In particular, it allows us to calculate both how far the
system is from the safety boundary as well as how quickly the system is approaching
it. This facilitates a calculation of how much each of the available control inputs will
affect how quickly the system approaches the boundary of safety. As a result, we can
then pick a control value that is as close as possible to the original system’s controller
that does not violate the safety objective. We will refer to the set of available control
inputs that do not approach the boundary too quickly as the admissible control space
and the system’s original controller as the nominal controller. Because a barrier
function allows the safety designer to select a control value as close as possible to the
nominal controller, we refer to the overriding safety controller as a minimally invasive
controller. Because a barrier function allows the safety designer to select a control
value as close as possible to the nominal controller, we refer to the overriding safety
controller as a minimally invasive controller. We make this idea precise below.
Consider now a more realistic example of a fixed-wing aircraft which will have
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more complicated dynamics than the simple car example of Figure 1.1. A common
use case is for a remotely controlled UAV that is equipped with an autopilot that
achieves waypoint commands. While the autopilot may be able to achieve waypoints,
it may not factor other aircraft into the calculation of the control inputs. For vehicles
operating in a dense region of space, simply using a waypoint following algorithm will
lead to high risk of aircraft collisions which can significantly disrupt operations, lead
to loss of aircraft, and place infrastructure below the crash at risk.
A simple solution to ensuring vehicles do not crash into each other is to be conser-
vative in what the vehicles are allowed to do. However, this can lead to performance
degradation. For the car example of Figure 1.1, this might mean that the car gets
to its goal location more slowly or simply cannot get to locations near to the wall.
Similarly, if high density operation is required for fixed-wing aircraft then an overly
conservative approach to safety might mean the system’s performance goal is com-
promised. However, as we discuss in this section, a barrier function allows the safety
system to select an overriding control value that is minimally invasive so it can get
as much performance out of the originally designed system without compromising
safety.
To design a barrier function, one needs to specify a model and then develop a
function that has particular properties that allow us to calculate both how far from
the safety boundary the state is and how quickly it is approaching the boundary. We
begin by specifying a model for fixed-wing aircraft. In particular, we assume small
bank and pitch angles and note that similar models have been used in prior work for
fixed-wing collision avoidance [5, 6, 7, 29, 39, 40]. We index each vehicle by i where
i ∈ {1, . . . , k} where k is the total number of vehicles. The state of each vehicle i is
then xi =
[
pi,x pi,y θi pi,z
]T
, where pi,x, pi,y, and pi,z are the x, y, and z positions
of vehicle, respectively, and θi is the rotation of the vehicle. The control input for




, where vi, ωi, and ζi are the forward speed, rotation
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speed, and vertical speed of the vehicle. We also assume that each vehicle can sense
the state of every other vehicle so that the sensing problem is a complete undirected
graph.
A critical consideration of this work is that the control inputs of the vehicle are
bounded and in particular, that the aircraft must maintain positive forward speed at
all times. The bounds for the control inputs are then vi ∈ [vmin, vmax] with vmin > 0,













Note that (1.1) is linear in the control input. Collision avoidance involves more
than a single aircraft, so for this reason we consider the overall system state as the
concatenation of all aircraft states
x =
[
x1 x2 . . . xk
]T
. (1.2)
The system (1.2) is an instantiation of the more general system
ẋ = f(x) + g(x)u, (1.3)
where f and g are locally Lipschitz functions, x ∈ Rn, and u ∈ U ⊂ Rm. Note that
(1.3) is linear in the control input. This allows us to calculate an overriding control
value using a Quadratic Program (QP) and will be described later. We also assume
that solutions are forward complete, meaning the system has a unique solution for
all time t ≥ 0 given a starting condition x(0). This assumption means that a model
is well defined for all future times and is necessary in order to make claims that the
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system will stay safe over an infinite horizon.
Given the state x, we can calculate properties of the state with an output function
h. The discussion of the car example from Figure 1.1 emphasized that it is important
to know both how far the system is from the safety boundary as well as how quickly
it is approaching the safety boundary. The output function h allows us to calculate
both values. To do this, we specify a set as a superlevel set of h, namely
C = {x ∈ D : h(x) ≥ 0}. (1.4)
In other words, when h(x) = 0, the system is at the boundary of safety and as h(x)
increases the system is further from the safety boundary. Further, the derivative of
h measures how quickly the state is approaching the safety boundary. In the below
definition Lfh(x) = ∂h(x)∂x f(x) and Lgh(x) =
∂h(x)
∂x
g(x) denote the Lie derivatives.
Definition 1. [4] Given a set C ⊂ Rn defined in (1.4) for a continuously differentiable
function h : Rn → R, the function h is called a zeroing control barrier function
(ZCBF) defined on an open set D with C ⊂ D ⊂ Rn, if there exists a Lipschitz
continuous extended class K function α such that
sup
u∈U
[Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)u+ α(h(x))] ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ D. (1.5)
The terms Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)u of (1.5) represents the time derivative of h when
using u as a control input. In other words, for a fixed control input, (1.5) becomes
ḣ(x) ≥ −α(h(x)). (1.6)
We can use (1.6) to show that the above definition encapsulates the idea that the state
can approach the safety boundary quickly when it is far from the safety boundary.
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First, note that for h(x) = 0, the derivative of h must be greater than or equal to
zero. On the other hand, if h(x) > 0 then the derivative of h can also be negative.
Further, the derivative of h can be increasingly negative the larger h(x) becomes.
From Definition 1, it follows that the admissible control space is defined in [4] as
K(x) = {u ∈ U : Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)u+ α(h(x)) ≥ 0}. (1.7)
This is the set of control inputs that ensure that the system is not approaching the
safety boundary too quickly.
Theorem 1. [4] Given a set C ⊆ Rn defined in (1.4) for a continuously differentiable
function h, if h is a ZCBF on D, then any Lipschitz continuous controller u : D → U
such that u(x) ∈ K(x) will render the set C forward invariant.
Theorem 1 says that if we pick a control input so that the system does not approach
the safety boundary too quickly then the system will stay safe for all future times.
Importantly, any selection such that u ∈ K(x) (provided it is Lipschitz continuous)
will suffice to ensure safety. As discussed in [4], this means that when K(x) has more
than one element, we can introduce performance criteria to select the best one.
Consider again the example of an autopilot that is designed to reach a waypoint.
We refer to the control input that is designed to reach a waypoint as the nominal
controller and denote this function by û. Suppose further that other aircraft are very
far away so that û(x) is safe in the sense that it will not cause a collision. In particular
assume that û ∈ K(x). Then by selecting the nominal control input, the system will
not only stay safe but also achieve its originally intended performance goal.
However, for the case that the nominal control input is not safe (i.e., û(x) /∈ K(x))
we can still select a safe control input that is close to the nominal control input. For
instance, suppose the nominal controller encodes a trajectory that points straight
at a waypoint but that this trajectory will lead to a collision. We may still allow
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the vehicle to deviate slightly from its intended target while still making progress by
selecting a control value in K(x) that is as close as possible to û as possible. Thus,
choosing u(x) ∈ K(x) ensures safety but choosing u(x) as close as possible to û can
retain performance, in the sense of being as close to the originally designed control
value as possible.
This idea is formalized in [4], where a QP is introduced to choose how to calculate
u(x) ∈ K(x) while being as close as possible to the nominal control value as possible.
A QP is an optimization problem where all of the constraints are linear and the
optimization cost is quadratic. Notice in particular that the constraint in (1.5) is
linear in u. Further, the constraints on the control input for fixed wing aircraft in



























A1 0 0 · · · 0
0 A2 0 · · · 0
0 0
. . . · · · 0
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Thus, the safety constraint (1.5) and actuator constraints (1.9) are both linear in the
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control in put u.
In addition to linear constraints, the QP must have a quadratic cost. Thus, to
encode the goal of picking a control input as close as possible to the nominal input û
we can minimize 1
2






s.t. Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)u+ α(h(x)) ≥ 0 (1.10b)
Au ≥ b. (1.10c)
The QP in (1.10) resolves two practical issues with applying barrier functions.
First, QPs can be solved very quickly so they are amenable to being run on UAVs
where a safe control input may need to be calculated many times per second. Second,
the QP will always be feasible. This is ensured because when h is a ZCBF as defined
in Definition 1, it satisfies the constraints of the problem.
Thus, when there is a ZCBF h available, safety can be guaranteed and a control
input can be calculated in an online manner. However, these strong conclusions are
predictated on having a ZCBF available for the system. This is non-trivial for sys-
tems such as fixed wing aircraft due to actuator constraints and nonlinear dynamics.
Nevertheless, we show in the next chapter how to derive such a ZCBF to guarantee




The last chapter introduced ZCBFs and how they can be used to make safety guar-
antees. However, it can be diffult to derive a ZCBF for a given system. We therefore
begin this chapter with a motivating example for fixed wing collision where the candi-
date ZCBF does not satisfy the constraint (1.5) before presenting a general approach
to deriving a ZCBF for the system.
2.1 Motivating Example
Consider a candidate ZCBF, h, that encodes a collision avoidance safety constraint







h(x) = d1,2(x)−D2s , (2.1)
where
d1,2(x) = (p1,x − p2,x)2 + (p1,y − p2,y)2 + (p1,z − p2,z)2
is the squared distance between vehicles 1 and 2 and Ds is a positive minimum safety
distance. In other words, the candidate barrier function encodes the safety constraint
directly. However, as we will show below, it does not fully account for the fact that
vehicles need to start avoiding each other well in advance of a collision. Intuitively,
we should not need wait for metal to crunch other metal to identify that the system is
unsafe. Instead, we should know well in advance of the collision point that a collision
is imminent which this candidate function does not encapsulate. We now examine
this point mathematically.
To show why h defined in (2.1) is not a ZCBF, we present an example where,
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even though the configuration of the aircraft is safe since x ∈ C, h(x) does not satisfy
constraint (1.5). Let x1 =
[




Ds/2 0 π −ϵ
]T
for






∈ C, h(x) ≥ 0. Further,
sup
u∈U
[Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)u+ α(h(x))] = sup
u∈U
[
2(p1,x − p2,x)(v1 cos θ1 − v2 cos θ2)
+ 2(p1,y − p2,y)(v1 sin θ1 − v2 sin θ2)




[−2Ds(v1 + v2) + 2ϵ(ζ1 − ζ2)]
= −4Dsvmin + 2ϵζmax.
Since vmin > 0 and Ds > 0, if the two vehicles’ initial positions satisfy 0 ≤ ϵ <
2Dsvmin/ζmax we observe that the quantity above does not satisfy constraint (1.5),
i.e., supu∈U [Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)u + α(h(x))] < 0. Therefore, we conclude that h(x)
defined in (2.1) is not a ZCBF. The problem with this candidate ZCBF is that it does
not account for the fact that by the time the vehicles are close to colliding, it may be
too late to avoid each other due to the limited turning radius and positive minimum
velocity.
Going back to the example of Figure 1.1, let the position of the vehicle be given
by p and let it be at the wall when p = 0. Although the safety objective is to ensure
that p ≥ 0 at all times, we cannot define h(x) = p because the car needs to brake
well in advance of the wall in order to slow down in time. In this case, when the car
is at the wall, h(x) = p = 0 so h indicates that the system is safe. However, if the car
has negative velocity there is nothing that can be done to prevent it from colliding
with the wall. Hence, a barrier function must encode not only that the system is safe
at the current moment, but also that the system is safe for future times as well. To
ensure this is the case, we now investigate how to define a barrier function in such a
way as to ensure that there is always a control input to keep the system safe whenever
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h(x) ≥ 0.
2.2 Constructing a Barrier Function via Evading Maneuvers
In order to overcome the difficulties demonstrated in the example of Section 2.1, we
introduce a method to systematically construct a ZCBF from a safety constraint. Let
ρ : D → R be a safety function that represents the safety objective we want to satisfy
at all times so that ρ(x) ≥ 0 indicates that the system is safe. In the example from
Section 2.1 for vehicles i and j,
ρ(x) = di,j(x)−D2s . (2.2)
Alternatively, for the car example of Section 2.1, ρ(x) = p. Second, let γ : D → U
be a nominal evading maneuver. Section 2.3.2 discusses specific examples of γ for
the UAV collision avoidance problem. For the car example of Figure 1.1, an example
nominal evading maneuver is to accelerate to the right. Assuming γ has been selected,
let
h(x; ρ, γ) = inf
τ∈[0,∞)
ρ(x̂(τ)), (2.3)





˙̂x(τ) = f(x̂(τ)) + g(x̂(τ))γ(x̂(τ)). (2.5)
For ease of notation, we will omit the time dependencies whenever the time is clear
from the context. We assume in this paper that the solution (2.4) is well defined and
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Figure 2.1: An example of how to calculate a barrier function for a system of two
UAVs. In this case the vehicles start pointing at each other. The vehicles must
maintain a minimum forward velocity so they cannot stop. Thus, they apply an
evasive maneuver where both vehicles turn left. As the state is propagated using this
evasive maneuver, the worse case distance along this trajectory is the value of the
barrier function.
contained in D for all τ ≥ 0 so that ρ(x̂(τ)) is well defined. This choice of a candidate
ZCBF h is motivated by the fact that in (2.3), h measures how close the state will get
to the boundary of the safe set assuming γ is used as the control input for all future
time. In other words, if the system is currently safe as defined by h(x) ≥ 0 then by
applying the nominal evading maneuver for all time the system will remain safe. An
intuition behind the constructive method in (2.3) is shown in Figures 1.1 and 2.1.
In Section 2.1 we saw that we could not use the Euclidean distance for a ZCBF
because when a candidate ZCBF h is defined as in (2.1), K(x) could be empty for
some x ∈ D. In other words, although x ∈ D there was no control input available to
keep the system safe. With h defined in (2.3), this problem is alleviated.
Theorem 2. Given a dynamical system (1.3) and a set C ⊂ D defined in (1.4) for
a continuously differentiable h defined in (2.3) with a safety function ρ and locally
Lipschitz evading maneuver γ, h satisfies (1.5) for all x ∈ C. If in addition, Lgh(x) is
non-zero for all x ∈ ∂C and γ maps to values in the interior of U , then h is a ZCBF
on an open set D where C ⊂ D.
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Proof. We start by assuming x ∈ C and show that h satisfies (1.5). Because x ∈ C,
h(x) ≥ 0 so α(h(x)) ≥ 0. Further, note that Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)γ(x) is the derivative
along the trajectory of x̂. In other words,


















and notice that it is the subtraction of an infimum of the same function ρ evaluated
on two different intervals. Further, note that the first interval is a subset of the second
interval since a approaches 0 from above. Thus, the term inside the parenthesis on
the right hand side of (2.6) is non-negative so Lfh(x)+Lgh(x)γ(x) ≥ 0. We can then
conclude that Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)γ(x) + α(h(x)) ≥ 0 so γ(x) ∈ K(x).
Now assume that Lgh(x) is non-zero for some x ∈ ∂C and γ maps to values in the
interior of U . We will show that there is an open set D that is a strict superset of C
for which (1.5) holds. Let x ∈ ∂C be such that Lgh(x) is non-zero and B(x, µ) be a
ball of radius µ > 0 such that for all z ∈ B(x, µ) \ C, Lgh(z) is non-zero. Such a ball
exists such that B(x, µ) \ C is nonempty because Lgh(x) is continuous. Let d(z) be
a non-zero vector such that d(z) + γ(x) ∈ U where d(z) is a non-zero vector in the
direction of Lgh(z). Note that such a vector exists because γ maps to the interior of
U . Also note that Lgh(z)d(z) > 0. Further restrict µ so that Lgh(z)d(z)+α(h(z)) ≥ 0
for all z ∈ B(x;µ) \ C. Note that for similar reasons discussed earlier in the proof,
Lfh(z) + Lgh(z)γ(z) ≥ 0. Then
Lfh(z) + Lgh(z)(γ(z) + d(z)) + α(h(z)) ≥ Lgh(x)d(z) + α(h(z)) ≥ 0.
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Remark 1. The intuitive reason why h satisfies (1.5) whenever h(x) is non-negative
is that we have by definition a control input γ available to keep the system safe.
A geometric view is presented in Figure 2.2. Note that γ is not the output of the
Quadratic Program (1.10). Instead, the role of γ is to allow h to be evaluated via
(2.3). In other words, there are three control values of interest in the safety override.
First, the nominal controller, û, is designed to accomplish a performance objective
like achieving a waypoint. The goal is to find a safe control value as close as possible
to û. Second, the evasive maneuver γ exists only to calculate h. Its role is to ensure
that the intersection of U and the hyperplane in Figure 2.2 is non-empty. Since this
intersection can have more than one point, we use the optimization (1.10) to get as
close as possible to û without violating the safety constraint. The solution to this
optimization is the third control value of interest which is the actually applied safe
control input u.
Remark 2. Theorem 2 holds for any class K function α. When α(h(x)) = 0, (1.5)
becomes ḣ(x) ≥ 0. In other words, Theorem (2) can also be used to prove Lyapunov
stability properties of a set by flipping the inequality.
2.3 Deriving a Barrier Function
2.3.1 Deriving a Barrier Function for Car Avoiding a Wall
We now discuss how to construct a barrier function for the example of Figure 1.1.





where p and vv are the car position and velocity, respectively. The









Figure 2.2: A geometric view of why h defined in (2.3) can be a barrier function.
Here U is shown as a closed convex polytope satisfying U = {u : Au ≥ b} and K(x)
is the half-space. The constraint (1.5) implies that the intersection of U and K(x)
is non-empty. When h is defined in (2.3), it satisfies this constraint by ensuring that
γ(x) ∈ U and γ(x) ∈ K(x) for all x ∈ C.
where av is the acceleration of the vehicle which is subject to the constraint that
|av| ≤ av,max. The safety constraint in this case is that the position of the vehicle
is nonnegative at all times. In other words, if the vehicle’s position is negative then
it has collided with the wall. For this reason we let ρ(x) = p. We then specify the
evasive maneuver as a positive acceleration av,γ that is less than av,max. We also
denote the initial position and velocity as p0 and vv,0, respectively. Given this setup,











The τ that minimizes (2.7) is given by τmin = max(0,−vv,0/av,γ). Then (2.7) becomes







Note that (2.8) is continuously differentiable with respect to p and vv for τmin > 0.
For the case of τmin = 0, we verify that the derivative is the same whether τmin = 0
or τmin = −vv,0/av,γ. In the first case where τmin = 0, ∂h(x)∂p = 1 and
∂h(x)
∂vv
= 0. In the





= 1 and ∂h(x)
∂vv
= −vv,0/av,γ = 0 because vv,0 = 0.
2.3.2 Deriving a Barrier Function for UAV Collision Avoidance
We now consider how to calculate h defined in (2.3) for the UAV collision avoidance
problem. From Theorem 2 the only restriction on γ and ρ is that γ is locally Lipschitz
and that h is continuously differentiable so there is some flexibility in choosing γ and
ρ. In this section we discuss two cases where we can choose γ and ρ so that h
can be calculated in closed form. Let the initial state for vehicle i (i = 1, 2) be
given by
[
pi,x0 pi,y0 θi,0 pi,z0
]T
. For these examples we can calculate h in (2.3)
for arbitrary initial states in closed form. Section 3 generalizes the results from
Section 2.2 by showing how to calculate k(k − 1)/2 barrier functions to ensure that
the k(k−1)/2 pairwise distance constraints are always satisfied. Because the examples
in this section calculate h in (2.3) using pairwise distance constraints, the calculations
in these examples will also apply to the case of more than two vehicles. In other words,
with the result of this section we can calculate barrier functions in closed form from
arbitrary initial states and numbers of vehicles. Note that the solutions in this section
solve for h in (2.3) in closed form where τ approaches infinity.
We emphasize that the specification of an evasive maneuver γ is necessary to
evaluate h in (2.3). In other words, without a safety engineer specifying γ there
cannot be a barrier function h. However, γ is never actually directly applied to the
actuators. Instead, its role is to specify h so that the final actuator command u
calculated in (1.10) can actually be applied to the aircraft. In this section we give
two examples where for a given γ, h can be calculated in closed form even though it
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is an integration over an infinite horizon. Further, while we provide two examples of
an evasive maneuver to calculate a continuously differentiable h from (2.3) in closed
form, we note that it a system specific derivation and we have not identified a general
method for finding a γ for an arbitrary system that allows h to be calculated in closed
form.
Example 1. In the first case, let
γturn =
[
σv ω 0 v ω 0
]T
(2.9)
with 0 < σ ≤ 1, ω ̸= 0. In other words, γturn is defined by the same turn rate
for both vehicles but possibly different translational velocities. See Figure 2.1 for an
example. Define r = v
ω
to be the turn radius of the evasive maneuver when traveling
at speed v, b1,0 = p1,x0−σr sin(θ1,0), b2,0 = p2,x0−r sin(θ2,0), c1,0 = p1,y0 +σr cos(θ1,0),
c2,0 = p2,y0 + r cos(θ2,0), ∆b0 = b1,0 − b2,0, ∆c0 = c1,0 − c2,0, and δ > 0. Let
ρ(x) = d1,2(x)− 2δ + δ sin(θ1)− δ cos(θ1)−D2s , (2.10)
where the δ terms are introduced to affect the smoothness of h. See the Appendix for




b1,0 + σr sin(ωτ + θ1,0)






b2,0 + r sin(ωτ + θ2,0)









(∆b0 + σr sin(ωτ + θ1,0)− r sin(ωτ + θ2,0)))2
+(∆c0 − σr cos(ωτ + θ1,0) + r cos(ωτ + θ2,0))2
+(p1,z0 − p2,z0)
2 − 2δ + δ sin(ωτ + θ1,0)− δ cos(ωτ + θ1,0)−D2s .





0 + (1 + σ
2)r2 − 2σr2 cos(θ1,0 − θ2,0)
+2σ∆b0r sin(ωτ + θ1,0)− 2∆b0r sin(ωτ + θ2,0)
−2σ∆c0r cos(ωτ + θ1,0) + 2∆c0r cos(ωτ + θ2,0)
+ (p1,z0 − p2,z0)
2 − 2δ + δ sin(ωτ + θ1,0)− δ cos(ωτ + θ1,0)−D2s .
(2.11)
Grouping constant terms and applying phasor addition yields
h(x) = inf
τ∈[0,∞)
A1 + A2 cos(ωτ +Θ)−D2s , (2.12)
where A1 results from grouping constant terms, while A2 and Θ are the amplitude
and phase resulting from the phasor addition so that A1 and A2 are functions of x.
By convention A1 and A2 are nonnegative with appropriate calculation of Θ. The
minimum in (2.12) then occurs at τ = (π − Θ + l2π)/ω for integers l resulting in
nonnegative t so that h(x) = A1 − A2 −D2s . Note that for the case where
ρ(x) =
√
d1,2(x)− 2δ + δ sin(θ1)− δ cos(θ1)−Ds, (2.13)
1The identities are sin2(α) + cos2(α) = 1 and cos(α− β) = cos(α) cos(β) + sin(α) sin(β).
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the same reasoning yields
h(x) =
√
A1 − A2 −Ds (2.14)
for ρ defined in (2.13). We refer to the h in (2.14) as hturn. To ensure that the square
root is well defined, we must then require that A1 − A2 ≥ 0 which occurs when the
vehicles do not get more than 2δ from each other along the trajectory defined by (2.4)
using γturn in (2.9). Since δ can be chosen to be arbitrarily small, it can be chosen
so that δ ≪ Ds so the vehicles are very far outside the safe set before this condition
occurs.
Example 2. For a second case, let ρ be given in (2.2) and
γstraight =
[
v1 0 ζ1 v2 0 ζ2
]T
, (2.15)
where v1 ̸= v2. An example of the barrier function constructed from this ρ and γ is
shown in Figure 2.3. In other words, γstraight uses a zero turn rate while allowing the
vehicles to have different speeds. In this case we have
h(x) = inf
τ∈[0,∞)
(p1,x0 + τv1 cos(θ1,0)− p2,x0 − τv2 cos(θ2,0))
2
+(p1,y0 + τv1 sin(θ1,0)− p2,y0 − τv2 sin(θ2,0))
2
+(p1,z0 + τζ1 − p2,z0 − τζ2)
2 −D2s , (2.16)
which is quadratic in τ so the minimum can be calculated in closed form. See the
Appendix for an analysis of the differentiability of h in this case. We refer to h
constructed from ρ(x) =
√
d1,2(x)−Ds and γstraight as hstraight.
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Figure 2.3: An example of a trajectory using an evasive maneuver where each vehicle
maintains a straight trajectory.
2.4 Some Considerations In Choosing An Evasive Maneuver
In this section we consider design tradeoffs in selecting a nominal evasive maneuver.
As the previous section suggests, a key aspect of choosing an evasive maneuver is being
able to find in closed form the worst case future safety function value when using the
evasive maneuver for all times. This was shown to be possible for both γturn and
γstraight in Section 2.3.2. Given multiple evasive maneuvers, we now consider how the
selection of an evasive maneuver can affect the observed performance the system.
We first discuss how the choice of an evading maneuver can affect the robustness
of the system to noise in the dynamics. Note that Theorem 2 requires that an eva-
sive maneuver be in the interior of the actuator constraints U . In particular, this
assumption allows the system to satisfy (2.3) even when the state is outside of the
safe set. Intuitively, the reason why it is important to define an evasive maneuver
well within actuator limits is that it allows for the control input to adjust in a neigh-
borhood around the evasive maneuver if anything goes wrong, as can happen when
there is a perturbation in the dynamics or the system starts in a configuration such
that h(x) < 0. The property that h satisfies (1.5) on an open set larger than C was
shown to make the system robust to perturbations in the dynamics in [46] and to be
important for ensuring system safety in Example 4 of [58]. Hence, it is important to
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select an evasive maneuver that operates well within the actuator limits.
Robustness to perturbations in dynamics is important since any model will have
some level of error in it when compared to a real world system. When the system is
robust it can possibly allow for a simpler model to be used when designing a controller.
We now consider a related idea, namely how a simple evasive maneuver might restrict
the available set of final overriding control values. For instance, notice that the evasive
maneuvers in (2.9) and (2.15) (when ζ1 = ζ2 = 0 in (2.15)) both encode trajectories
where the vehicles maintain the same altitude for all times. This might indicate that
the overriding safety controller might be limited to planar maneuvers and is therefore
not exploiting an important evasive capability of the aircraft, namely the ability to
change altitudes. However, this is not actually the case. Although γturn and γstraight
(for ζ1 = ζ2 = 0) are purely planar maneuvers, they nevertheless can induce behaviors
that exploit altitude changes. To see this, note that for h in (2.12) and (2.16),
∂h(x)
∂p1,z0
= 2(p1,z0 − p2,z0), (2.17)




In other words, h changes as a function of initial altitude. Specifically, this means
that the QP can exploit ζ1 and ζ2 because the fourth and eighth elements of Lgh(x(t))
are non-zero when p1,z0 ̸= p2,z0 , i.e., the QP in (1.10) can exploit the altitude control
input even though γturn and γstraight do not necessarily include an altitude changing
term in the evasive maneuver. Similarly, although γstraight appears to not encode the
ability to turn, we will observe in the simulation experiments of the next section that
the overriding control value does allow the system to turn.
This confirms an important distinction between the distinct control values we
consider in this thesis, namely the safe control value u(x) and the evasive maneuver
γ(x). The evasive maneuver only exists to facilitate the calculation of the barrier
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function h. Unlike the safe control value, it does not ever need to be applied to the
system unless it happens to be a solution to the QP (1.10). However, the specification
of the evading maneuver γ can have a significant effect on the safe control value u.
2.5 Simulation of Two Vehicles
We demonstrate the theoretical development of this section in simulation using SCRIM-
MAGE [59]. SCRIMMAGE is a multi-agent simulator designed to scale to high num-
bers of vehicles and includes a plugin-interface that makes it easy to experiment with
different motion models and controllers without having to change code. This makes
it simple to swap out nominal controllers and vary the fidelity of fixed-wing UAVs
from the unicycle dynamics in (1.1) used in this section up to a 6-DOF model.
For the simulation, let k vehicles be positioned in a circle of radius 200 around



















, where ψ is an additional
offset so that vehicles are not necessarily starting with orientation pointing at the













This setup is selected so that the vehicles are on a collision course. The nominal
controller is that described in [60] with constant λ = 1. Additionally, we let vmin = 15
meters/second, vmax = 25 meters/second, ζmax = 3.9 meters/second, ωmax = 13
degrees/second, Ds = 5 meters, and δ = 0.01 meters2. The choice of ζmax results from
assuming a maximum pitch of 15 degrees while traveling at vmin. ωmax is chosen to be
consistent with a constant rate turn [61] with a 30 degree bank with a speed of vmax.
We note that while the experiments do not consider dynamics or sensor noise, the
robustness of barrier functions to noise was previously discussed in [46]. Each vehicle
evaluates (1.10) at each timestep where we use OSQP [62] to evaluate the QP. We
investigate the performance of the vehicles when h defined in (2.3) is constructed from
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γturn in (2.9) and γstraight (2.15), respectively, where γturn =
[





v 0 0 v 0 0
]T
, and v = 0.9vmin + 0.1vmax and ω = 0.9ωmax. For the
scenario with γturn, we let ψ = 0 so that the vehicles start with orientation pointing at
the origin. For the scenario with γstraight, we let ψ = 2◦ because if the vehicles pointed
at the origin they would not start in the safe set. Additionally, for the γturn case we
use ρ in (2.13). Similarly, for the γstraight case we use ρ(x) =
√
d1,2(x)−Ds. Details
of the distance between the vehicles and control signals are shown in Figures 2.4
and 2.5. Note that the resulting trajectory can be different depending on which γ
is used as shown in Figure 2.5b. Nevertheless, in both cases the vehicles are able to
maintain safe distances from each other and satisfy actuator constraints throughout
the simulation regardless of which γ is used to construct a h.
In the second experiment, we examine the effect of altitude control on the evasive
behavior of the aircraft. Because (2.17) predicts that ∂h(x)
∂pi,z0
̸= 0 (for i = 1, 2) only
when the vehicles are not at the same altitude, we start the vehicles at an altitude of
−1 and 1, respectively. This offset is small enough to ensure that the nominal path of
the vehicles still involves a collision. As was done in the previous experiment, we set
ψ = 0◦ and ψ = 2◦ degrees when using γturn and γstraight, respectively. In Figure 2.6
we show the output of ζ1, where overriding behavior peaks around 8.2 seconds. Notice
that the actuator output is within the limits of ±ζmax. Further, the vehicles maintain
safe distances at all times. This occurs even though the evading maneuver does not
explicitly encode altitude changes.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have shown how to ensure that two fixed wing aircraft do not
collide. However, it involved a series of assumptions. In the rest of the thesis we
examine whether similar conclusions can still be achieved when these assumptions
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Figure 2.4: Control outputs for the scenario with 2 fixed-wing vehicles. The blue
dashed and orange solid lines are the output of the scenario where h is constructed
from γstraight and γturn, respectively. The barrier function chooses control values so
that vehicle 1 velocity, turn rate, and altitude rates are within the actuator limits in
(a), (b), and (c), respectively. Further note that the control values are within the
actuator constraints. Adapted with permission from [63] ©2018 IEEE.
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Figure 2.5: Safety outputs for the scenario with 2 fixed-wing vehicles. The blue
dashed and orange solid lines are the output of the scenario where h is constructed
from γstraight and γturn, respectively. The minimum distance between the vehicles is
shown to be above Ds in (a) where the output is very similar in both scenarios. The
path taken by vehicle 1 is shown in (b). Note that the choice of γ in constructing h
has a significant effect on the path taken. Adapted with permission from [63] ©2018
IEEE.
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Figure 2.6: (a) A plot of ζ1 as a function of time when h is parameterized by γturn
and γstraight, respectively. Note the overriding control values around 8.2 seconds and
that ζ1 is within ±ζmax. (b) The same plot zoomed in with individual control values
plotted to indicate that the control signal does not experience abrupt changes.
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Table 2.1: A list of initial assumptions required to ensure system safety
Assumption Effect of Removing Assumption
One Safety Constraint see Chapter 3
Unlimited Communication see Chapter 4
Infinite Range Sensors see Chapter 5
Known Dynamics Model see Chapter 6
are relaxed. See Table 2.1 for a summary of these assumptions. In some cases, safety
can still be guaranteed but there may be additional assumptions necessary or reduced
performance. We find that the only assumption we cannot relax without giving
up a strict safety guarantee is the assumption of a known model for the dynamics.
Nevertheless, even in this case we are able to derive an algorithm where, even though
there are non-zero observed collisions, the experimental collision rates are significantly
reduced when using the proposed algorithm over the nominal system. Further, the
algorithm that does not require dynamics allows the system designer to get more
performance out of the system than the approach of this chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
COMPOSITION OF MULTIPLE SAFETY CONSTRAINTS
The previous chapter showed how to create a framework to maximize the performance
of a system while ensuring that one safety constraint is always satisfied. In this chapter
we relax the assumption that only one safety constraint must be satisfied at all times
and instead consider the case of satisfying multiple constraints simultaneously. By
solving the problem of how to ensure safety while maximizing performance of the
system under arbitrarily many safety constraints, we are able to solve the specific
problem of arbitrarily many aircraft in a dense space without collisions.
We motivate the need for multiple safety constraints by introducing additional
vehicles into the collision avoidance problem. This means that while the prior chapter
only required that vehicles 1 and 2 maintain safe distances, we now must consider,
in the case of three vehicles, how to ensure that vehicles 1 and 2 do not collide in
addition to considering the distances between vehicles 1 and 3 as well as vehicles 2
and 3. We generalize the results to arbitrarily many vehicles.
A straightforward application of the previous chapter might be to create a barrier
function for each safety constraint in the system (e.g., a ZCBF to ensure vehicles 1
and 2 cannot collide, another ZCBF to ensure vehicles 1 and 3 cannot collide, etc)
and at each timestep have each vehicle select a safe actuator command satisfying all
of the constraints. However, while the prior chapter showed that there exists some
actuator value that satisfies each individual ZCBF constraint, it may be the case
that there is not an actuator value to satisfy all ZCBF constraints simultaneously.
To motivate the discussion, we begin by presenting one such example. The essential
issue is that the safety override to ensure one constraint is safe may lead to the other
constraint being violated and vice versa.
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Having shown that having a set of individual barrier functions is not sufficient
to guarantee that all safety constraints will be satisfied at all times, we introduce
an additional assumption called the shared evading maneuver assumption. This as-
sumption requires that the same evading maneuver is used to ensure safety for each
constraint. Recall that in the previous chapter we demonstrated that constructing a
barrier function with a nominal evading maneuver means the system can always use
the evading maneuver to satisfy the safety constraint. Similarly, the shared evad-
ing maneuver assumption means that the evading maneuver can be used to satisfy
each individual safety constraint, and as a consequence, it can be used to satisfy all
constraints.
3.1 Motivating Example
Although the constructive method introduced in (2.3) can produce a barrier function
in the presence of actuator constraints that ensures two vehicles do not collide, the
formulation does not extend immediately to collision avoidance for systems with more
than two vehicles. To see this, we present a specific example where three UAVs with a
collision avoidance safety objective cannot use the results from Section 2.2 to ensure
safety. A plot of this scenario is shown in Figure 3.1. We index the vehicles by
i = 1, 2, 3.
To ensure collision-free trajectories, and considering the safety function defined in
(2.10), three pairwise constraints must be nonnegative at all times:
ρ1(x) = d1,2(x)− 2δ + δ sin(θ1)− δ cos(θ1)−D2s ,
ρ2(x) = d1,3(x)− 2δ + δ sin(θ1)− δ cos(θ1)−D2s ,
ρ3(x) = d2,3(x)− 2δ + δ sin(θ2)− δ cos(θ2)−D2s .












Figure 3.1: A geometric view of the example given in Section 3.1. In (a), h1 defined
in (2.3) is constructed to design a function so that vehicles 1 and 2 stay safe. Here
γ1 encodes an evasive maneuver where vehicles 1 and 2 turn right. Further, vehicles
1 and 2 are placed so that turning right is the only available control input to keep
the system safe. In (b), a similar setup is shown for vehicles 1 and 3 where h2 has
been constructed from γ2 which encodes an evasive maneuver where vehicles 1 and
3 turn left and vehicles 1 and 3 are placed so they are only able to turn left to stay
safe. In (c), vehicle 1 cannot turn both right and left to avoid vehicles 2 and 3,
respectively. Although vehicle 1 can avoid them individually, it cannot avoid them
both simultaneously.
maintain safe distances from each other. We now apply the results of Section 2 to
these constraints and for simplicity, let δ be approximately 0. For each constraint,
define an arbitrarily chosen nominal evading maneuver
γ1(x) =
[
1 −1 0 1 −1 0 1 −1 0
]T
(3.0a)
γ2(x) = γ3(x) =
[
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
]T
. (3.0b)
In other words, γ1 encodes an evasive maneuver where all the vehicles turn right
while γ2 and γ3 encode a maneuver where all the vehicles turn left. We note that hj
(j = 1, . . . , 3) defined in (2.3) and constructed from ρj and γj are ZCBFs. In other
words, safety can be guaranteed for a single safety constraint (e.g., that vehicles 1
and 2 will not collide) but not necessarily all three constraints (e.g., that vehicles
1 and 3, or 2 and 3, will not collide). In this example we let vmin = 1, vmax = 2,
ωmax = 1, and Ds = 0.5 so that the vehicles follow a circular trajectory with radius















(2r +Ds) sinψ 2r − (2r +Ds) cosψ π 0
]T
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. These states are selected so that h1(x), h2(x), and
h3(x) are all 0. See Figure 3.2 for the geometric setup that leads to these states being
selected. In particular these states imply that vehicles 1 and 2 must turn right to
avoid each other while vehicles 1 and 3 must turn left to avoid each other. At the
same time, the states also imply that h1(x), h2(x), and h3(x) are all nonnegative so
the system appears to be safe. We denote the safe sets associated with h1, h2, and
h3 as C1, C2, and C3, respectively.
Since h1(x) = h2(x) = h3(x) = 0, the barrier constraints in (1.5) for h1(x) and
h2(x) become
−0.4(v1 + ω1 + v2 + ω2) ≥ 0 (3.1)
0.4(−v1 + ω1 − v3 + ω3) ≥ 0. (3.2)
Although h1 and h2 are ZCBFs, these two constraints cannot be simultaneously sat-
isfied for vi ∈ [vmin, vmax] and |ωi| ≤ ωmax. In particular, after substituting the
minimum velocity v1 = v2 = 1, the first equation dictates that ω1 + ω2 ≤ −2 (i.e.,
vehicles 1 and 2 must turn right). Similarly, the second equation dictates that vehicle
1 and 3 must turn left. The problem with this scenario is that vehicle 1 cannot simul-
taneously execute both nominal evading maneuvers (i.e., turn both left and right at
the same time). To solve this problem, we will make sure that the evasive maneuver
applied by a vehicle is the same for every barrier function. A geometric view of the
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Figure 3.2: The geometric constraints that result in a case where safety cannot be
maintained for three vehicles simultaneously. Vehicles 1 and 2 are placed so that only
a hard right turn will keep them safe. Similarly, vehicles 1 and 3 are placed so that




Figure 3.3: A geometric view of why having a set of individual barrier functions does
not guarantee that a control input u exists to satisfy each associated constraint and
how the shared evading maneuver assumption resolves this issue. In (a), multiple
barrier function constraints are shown as half-spaces. To satisfy Corollary 1, a u
must be selected that is in the intersection of K1(x), K2(x), and U . In (b), although
there exists a u that is in the intersection of U and K1(x) as well as U and K2(x), as
ensured by the fact that h1 and h2 are ZCBFs, there does not exist a u that is in the
intersection of U , K1(x), and K2(x). This case corresponds to the specific scenario
for the three vehicle collision avoidance problem in Figure 3.1c. In (c), the problem
is resolved by the shared evading maneuver because γs(x) satisfies each constraint.
general problem and its solution are shown in Figure 3.3.
Recall now the example of Section 2.1. In that example, the problem was that
the candidate barrier function only calculated whether vehicles were currently in a
collision but did not encode whether a future collision would occur. By discarding
this candidate function in favor of hstraight and hturn, future collisions are taken into
account. Put another way, the candidate barrier function of Section 2.1 rendered
some states safe that were not actually safe because there was no overriding control
value available to keep the system safe. This problem is alleviated by using a barrier
function defined in (2.3) because γ is always available to keep the system safe. In
the example of this section, we actually have a related problem. In particular, there
are states where h1(x) and h2(x) are both nonnegative but the state is nevertheless
unsafe. We therefore need to update h1 and h2 so that there not only exists a safe
overriding control value to keep a single safety constraint value safe, but also it is the
same safe overriding value that can be used across all safety constraints. As we will
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see, the solution is to use the same γ across all barrier functions so that γ can be
used to keep the system safe for all safety constraints.
3.2 Sufficient Conditions for Satisfying Multiple Safety Constraints
In order to solve the issues arising when vehicles have to simultaneously respect
multiple constraints, we now extend the use of the constructive technique introduced
in (2.3). In this section we extend the reasoning of [4] to the case of q constraints.
Consider a nonlinear autonomous system
ẋ = f(x) (3.3)
where f is locally Lipschitz. Then we have a similar definition to Definition 1 for
autonomous systems.
Definition 2. [4] Given a set C ⊂ Rn defined in (1.4) for a continuously differentiable
function h : Rn → R, the function h is called a zeroing barrier function (ZBF) defined
on an open set D with C ⊂ D ⊂ Rn, if there exists a Lipschitz continuous extended
class K function α such that
Lfh(x) ≥ −α(h(x)), ∀x ∈ D. (3.4)
When there are q constraints, we consider the case of q barrier functions where
each barrier function is denoted hj on Dj with associated safe set Cj and admissible
control space Kj(x) for x ∈ Dj for j ∈ {1, . . . , q}. We are interested in the conditions
under which all safety constraints can be satisfied for all future times. In other words,
under the assumption that x(0) ∈ Cj we want to show that x(t) ∈ Cj for all t ≥ 0.
Hence, we are interested in the forward invariance of the intersection of all the safe
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sets, which motivates the following definitions
C∩ = C1 ∩ C2 ∩ · · · ∩ Cq, (3.5)
K∩(x) = {u ∈ U : u ∈ K1(x) ∩K2(x) ∩ · · · ∩Kq(x)}. (3.6)
where D∩ is an open superset of C∩ and x ∈ D∩. We can now present a multiple
constraint analogue of Theorem 1 by following the same reasoning as [4].
Proposition 1. Given a dynamical system (3.3) and a set C∩ defined by (3.5) for
continuously differentiable functions hj : Rn → R where hj is a ZBF on Dj with
Cj ⊂ Dj ⊂ R and ∂h
j(x)
∂x
̸= 0 for any x ∈ ∂C∩ where hj(x) = 0, then C∩ is forward
invariant.
Proof. The proof is the same as that for Proposition 1 of [4], namely ḣj(x) = −α(x) ≥
0 for any j such that hj(x) = 0 so the result follows by Nagumo’s Theorem [64]. We
add the assumption that ∂h
j(x)
∂x
is non-zero for all x ∈ ∂C∩ such that hj(x) = 0 to
ensure that the tangent cone in Nagumo’s Theorem is non-empty.
Then for autonomous systems with dynamics (1.3), we have the following corollary
of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. Given a dynamical system (1.3) and a set C∩ defined by (3.5) for con-
tinuously differentiable functions hj : Rn → R where hj is a ZCBF on Dj and
∂hj(x)
∂x
̸= 0 for any x ∈ ∂C∩ where hj(x) = 0, then any Lipschitz continuous controller
u : D∩ → U such that u(x) ∈ K∩(x) will render the set C∩ forward invariant.
Corollary 1 means that multiple safety constraints can be simultaneously satisfied
provided the safety overriding controller satisfies the assumptions. Note an important
difference between Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 however. In Theorem 1 it shows the
constraints on a controller to keep the state within a single set C. On the other
hand, Corollary 1 gives constraints on a controller to keep the state within a possibly
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much smaller set C∩. In other words, the conclusion of Corollary 1 is a stronger
statement and therefore hints that satisfying u(x) ∈ K∩(x) in Corollary 1 is more
difficult than satisfying u(x) ∈ K(x) in Theorem 1. This suggests that to satisfy
this stronger requirement we may need an additional assumption which we discuss
in the next section. The assumption, which we call the shared evading maneuver
assumption, ensures that K∩(x) is non-empty by ensuring that the same nominal
evading maneuver is in Kj(x) for k = 1, . . . , q. With this additional assumption, we
can ensure that a safety overriding controller not only exists but also that it can be
calculated in real-time.
3.3 The Shared Nominal Evading Maneuver Assumption
Suppose there are q constraints ρj : Dj → R (j = 1, . . . , q) that must be greater than
or equal to 0 at all times. For the k agents with pairwise constraints, q = k(k− 1)/2.
We assume that for each constraint j = 1, . . . , q, a locally Lipschitz nominal evading
maneuver γj has been selected using the framework in (2.3). An example for fixed-
wing UAVs with collision avoidance safety constraints is given in (2.9). Given q safety
functions ρj and evading maneuvers γj for j ∈ {1, . . . , q}, we construct q output
functions hj defined on Dj similarly to (2.3) where







˙̂xj(τ) = f(x̂j(τ)) + g(x̂j(τ))γj(x̂j(τ)). (3.9)
Section 3.1 showed an example where K∩(x) could be empty for some x ∈ C∩. As
a result, the assumptions of Corollary 1 could not be satisfied. In order to address
the issue discussed in Section 3.1, we introduce an additional constraint on γj (j =
1, . . . , q) that all hj are constructed from the same nominal evading maneuver.
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Assumption 1. Given a dynamical system (1.3) and q output functions hj defined in
(3.7) for given safety functions ρj and evading maneuvers γj for j ∈ {1, . . . , q}, the
shared evading maneuver assumption holds if γ1(x) = · · · = γq(x) for all x ∈ D∩.
The shared evading maneuver is denoted γs so that
γs(x) = γ1(x) = · · · = γq(x) (3.10)
for all x ∈ D∩.
Remark 3. This assumption requires that each hj (j = 1, . . . , q) be constructed from
the same nominal evading maneuver. Note, however, that this does not imply that
each hj must be constructed from the same safety function ρj.
Remark 4. To gain an intuition of the importance of the shared evasive maneuver,
consider an example unrelated to barrier functions, namely the paradox of Buridan’s
Donkey.1 In this paradox, a donkey is placed perfectly in the middle between two
completely identical stacks of hay. Due to the symmetry of the problem, there is
no reason to choose one stack over the other, so the donkey will eventually starve.
Similar to Buridan’s Donkey, the situation in Figure 3.1 is an impossible choice be-
cause both safety factors are critical. There is no mechanism to prioritize one safety
objective over the other because both objectives must be met at all times. However,
an indirect solution that applies to both the paradox and Figure 3.1 is to avoid the
problematic situation altogether. For Buridan’s Donkey, that means only letting the
donkey see one stack of hay (see Figure 3.4). For barrier functions, that means using
only one evasive maneuver across all barrier functions. This means that the situation
in Figure 3.1 will never occur because in this case h1(x) would not be safe since the
shared evasive maneuver requires that both vehicles turn left.




Figure 3.4: (a) Buridan’s Donkey cannot decide which stack of hay to eat so it starves.
(b) By giving the donkey only one stack of hay, it is able to avoid starvation. The
solution in (b) avoids starvation by not allowing the situation in (a) to occur in the
first place. The same idea occurs with the shared evading maneuver. Rather than
allowing situations where there is no control action available to satisfy two safety
constraints, the shared evading maneuver simplifies the problem by ensuring a single
solution exists across all safety problems.
γ2(x) defined in (3.1) are not the same. To enforce that the shared evasive maneuver
assumption holds, one option is to change γ1 so that
γ1(x) =
[
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
]T
. (3.11)
In other words, using γ1 defined in (3.11) and γ2 and γ3 in (3.0b) implies an evasive
maneuver where all vehicles turn left for each constraint. Another example where the
shared nominal evading maneuver assumption holds is as follows:
γs(x) = γ1(x) = γ2(x) = γ3(x) =[
1 1 0 1.5 0 0 2 −1 0
]T
.
In this case, γs(x) encodes an evasive maneuver where vehicle 1 turns left with a linear
velocity of 1, vehicle 2 stays straight with a linear velocity of 1.5, and vehicle 3 turns
right with a linear velocity of 2. These three nominal evading maneuvers satisfy the
shared evasive maneuver assumption because for all x ∈ D∩, γ1(x) = γ2(x) = γ3(x).
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To see the purpose of Assumption 1, we first examine the case of a single con-
straint. In particular, let h be defined in (2.3) and consider the role of γ in establishing
that h is a ZCBF. From Definition 1, for h to be used for a barrier function, K(x)
must be nonempty for all x ∈ D. With h defined as in (2.3), this property is satisfied
by γ(x) or a perturbation of γ(x) for all x ∈ D (see Theorem 2). The analogue
condition for multiple constraints is that K∩(x) is non-empty for all x ∈ D∩. If each
hj defined in (2.3) is a ZCBF and is constructed from γj then by similar reasoning to
Theorem 2, γj(x) or a perturbation of γ(x) is in Kj(x) for all x ∈ D∩. This allows
us to state a multiple constraint analogue to Theorem 2. In the following, we denote
the inner product as ⟨Lghj1(x), Lghj2(x)⟩ for j1, j2 ∈ {1, . . . , q}.
Theorem 3. Given a dynamical system (1.3) and a set C∩ ⊂ D∩ defined in (3.5) for q
continuously differentiable functions hj defined in (3.7) with safety functions ρj and
evading maneuvers γj where k ∈ {1, . . . , q}, if hj is a ZCBF for k ∈ {1, . . . , q} and
Assumption 1 holds then K∩(x) is non-empty for all x ∈ C∩. If in addition, γs defined
in (3.10) maps to the interior of U and for all x ∈ ∂C∩, ⟨Lghj1(x), Lghj2(x)⟩ > 0 for
j1 ̸= j2 and j1, j2 ∈ {1, . . . , q}, then there is an open set that is a superset of C∩ for
which K∩(x) is non-empty for all x in the open set.
Proof. To prove the first statement, note that it was shown in the proof of Theorem 2
that γs is in Kj(x) for j = 1, . . . , q and x ∈ C∩. To prove the second statement, note
that we can use the same method as was used in the proof of Theorem 2 to find
a vector d(z) such that hj(z) satisfies (1.5) for all z ∈ B(x, µ) given x ∈ ∂C∩. In
particular, because ⟨Lghj1(x), Lghj2(x)⟩ > 0, Lghj(x) ̸= 0 for j = 1, . . . , q there exists
a vector dall(x) such that ⟨dall(x), Lghj(x)⟩ > 0. We choose dall(x) with sufficiently
small norm. Using the notation of the proof of Theorem 2, for sufficiently small µ,
the projection of dall(x) onto Lgh(z) will be in the direction of Lgh(z) for z ∈ B(x, µ)
because Lgh(x) is continuous.
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Remark 5. A geometric view of the problem introduced in Section 3.1 and its resolu-
tion via the shared evading maneuver assumption is shown in Figure 3.3.
Theorem 3 gives sufficient conditions for ensuring that multiple safety constraints
can be satisfied for all times. Further, we can calculate the safe overriding control
value in real time by adding constraints to (1.10). In particular, for q safety con-




2 · · · ûTk
]T
where ûi is the nominal input of vehicle i for
i = 1, . . . , k. To emphasize that all hj are constructed from γs, we write hj,s for each






s.t. Au ≥ b.
Lfh
j,s(x) + Lgh
j,s(x)u+ α(hj,s(x)) ≥ 0 j ∈ {1, . . . , q}.
In other words, safety for multiple constraints can be guaranteed with a fast on-
line calculation by satisfying the shared evading maneuver assumption and adding
constraints to the QP.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have shown that merely being able to ensure individual safety
constraints are satisfied does not mean all constraints can be satisfied simultaneously.
To verify this insight we presented a particular example where it is impossible to
satisfy multiple constraints. This occurs where a vehicle must turn left to avoid one
of its neighbors but must turn right to avoid its other neighbor. The example hints
that always using a consistent evasive maneuver for all safety objectives can resolve
this problem. We encode this intuition in the shared evading maneuver assumption
and show that under this assumption we can ensure that multiple safety constraints
can be satisfied for all future time. We therefore add this conclusion to the table of
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Table 3.1: A list of assumptions required to ensure system safety after adding the
shared evading maneuver
Assumption Effect of Removing Assumption
One safety constraint still safe but additional assumption required (shared
evading maneuver)
Unlimited Communication see Chapter 4
Infinite Range Sensors see Chapter 5
Known dynamics model see Chapter 6




In Chapter 2 we showed that by specifying an evasive maneuver, we could guarantee
the system will stay safe for all times. Chapter 3 then expanded on this concept by
showing that if the same evasive maneuver is used to across multiple safety constraints
then all the constraints could be satisfied for all times. In other words, the previous
chapter relaxed one assumption from Chapter 2, namely that there was only one safety
objective. In this chapter we remove another assumption, namely that the vehicles can
communicate their control signals. In particular, we show that the calculation of the
admissible control space requires knowledge of all vehicle control values and therefore
implies a significant communication overhead in the case of a swarm of aircraft. Thus,
in this chapter we remove the assumption that vehicles can communicate their low
level control signals and show that we can still ensure safety in this case.
Consider now how to implement the conclusions of Chapters 2 and 3 for UAV
collision avoidance. In particular, after specifying a dynamics model, we construct hj
in (2.3) by using the same evasive maneuver γ for each hj. After that we calculate
the QP in (3.12) at every timestep to ensure the control value applied to the vehicles
is not only safe but also as close as possible to the original control value û.
To make such a calculation, the vehicles then need access to the following: the
evasive maneuver of the other vehicle γs and safety objectives ρj, the state x, and the
nominal control value û. We assume that the evasive maneuver γs and safety functions
ρj are known at deployment time via a locker room agreement. We consider the case
where x is not always known in the next chapter. In this chapter we consider û.




is the nominal control value that is the concatenation of
both vehicle’s individual nominal control values. In other words, for the first vehicle to
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calculate the QP in (3.12), it must know the nominal control value of the other vehicle.
This implies a communication link between the two vehicles that requires frequently
communicating this value without any delays. However, frequently communicating
this signal when there are many vehicles may reduce throughput for other important
messages or introduce communication delays because a network can only support a
limited number of bits per second through a network. Thus, we show how to ensure
safety constraints can be satisfied by reformulating the QP so that the vehicles can
calculate a safe control signal without requiring each other’s nominal control input.
However, we continue to assume that each vehicle can sense the state of every other
vehicle. See Chapter 5 for relaxing this assumption.
The approach discussed below is to start with the ZCBF constraint (1.5) and note
that the components Lgh(x) and u are vectors. Hence their inner product is the sum of
individual terms. The insight below is that we can then break up the individual terms
of Lgh(x)u into terms where some terms only depend on the first aircraft’s control
input while the other terms only depend on the second aircraft’s control input. This
results in breaking (1.5) into two constraints where the first constraint only depends
on the first individual aircraft’s control value and similarly for the second constraint.
We finally exploit the fact that γ can be similarly decomposed and can then be used
to ensure that both individual constraints can always be satisfied. The result is each
individual aircraft can calculate a QP that only depends on its own control value that
nevertheless ensures safety.
4.1 Limited Communication for Two Vehicles









be the shared evading maneuver where γs1 is the part of γs that
is applied to vehicle 1 and therefore has the same size as u1. Define γs2 similarly















. Further, let A in (1.10c) be block diagonal
with block entries A1 and A2 so that Aiuu ≥ bi represents the actuator constraint for
vehicle i for i = 1, 2.







Au ≥ b and u ∈ Kj(x) for all x ∈ D where the calculation for u1 does not require
knowledge of û2 or the final value for u2. Similarly, we want to calculate u2 without
knowledge of û1 or u1. This is a trivial requirement for actuator constraints since
Aiui ≥ bi for i = 1, 2 if and only if Au ≥ b. However, the constraint that u ∈ K∩(x)






 = [Lgh(x)]1u1 + [Lgh(x)]2u2
so that
0 ≤ Lfhj,s(x) + Lghj,s(x)u+ α(hj,s(x)) (4.1)
= κ1(x, u1) + κ2(x, u2) (4.2)
where











j,s(x)γs + α(hj,s(x))) (4.3)
and











j,s(x)γs + α(hj,s(x))). (4.4)
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Notice that κ1 is not a function of u2 and κ2 is not a function of u1. In other







∈ K∩(x) ∀x ∈ D. We must then show that K∩(x) is non-empty for
all in an open set that is larger than C∩. For x ∈ C∩, this can be done by letting
u1 = γ
s
1(x) and u2 = γs2(x) and noting that this implies
κ1(x, γ
s




j,s(x)γs + α(hj,s(x)) ≥ 0.
For x /∈ C∩, a perturbation of γs1(x) and γs2(x) using a similar method as shown in the
proof of Theorem 3 suffices. In other words, we can find u without vehicle 1 needing
to know û2 or u2 and similarly for vehicle 2. Each vehicle i (i = 1, 2) could then






s.t. Aiui ≥ bi
κi(x, ui) ≥ 0.
Note that κi(x, ui) is linear in ui. To summarize, we started with the ZCBF con-
straint in (1.5), and split the Lgh(x)u term into two components that depend on u1
and u2 respectively. Because each vehicle can always use the component of γ that
corresponds to its own control input, there is always a control input to keep the ve-
hicles safe. Further, this calculation can again be done with a QP so there is a fast
online calculation of the safe control input available at all times.
4.2 Limited Communication for k Vehicles









where γsi maps to vectors of the same size as ui for i = 1, . . . , k with similar decom-
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position for b =
[





j,s(x)]T1 · · · [Lghj,s(x)]Tk
]T
.
Further, assume A in (1.10c) is block diagonal with block entries Ai for i = 1, . . . , k
where Ai is a mi ×mi matrix. This assumption means that actuator constraints are
not coupled between vehicles.
The main difference when there k > 2 than when k = 2 is that not every vehicle
affects every constraint. For instance, in the example of Section 3.1, vehicle 3 does
not affect h1 since h1 is only designed to keep vehicles 1 and 2 from colliding. For
this reason we denote
Vj = {i ∈ {1, . . . , k} : ∃x ∈ D s.t. [Lghj,s(x)]i ̸= 0mi}
where 0mi is the zero vector in Rmi and j ∈ {1, . . . , q}. Vj represents the set of vehicles
whose control input affects the time derivative of hj for some x ∈ D. We let |Vj|
denote the cardinality of Vj, and note that for the case of pairwise collision avoidance,
|Vj| = 2 for all j = 1, . . . , q. In the example with three vehicles in Section 3.1,
V1 = {1, 2}, V2 = {1, 3}, V3 = {2, 3}. We also denote Si = {j ∈ {1, . . . , q} : i ∈ Vj}
so that Si is the set of safety constraint indices where ui has an effect on the time
derivative of the associated barrier function for some x ∈ D. For the three vehicle
example of Section 3, S1 = {1, 2}, S2 = {1, 3}, S3 = {2, 3}.
Finally, we denote u\i =
[
uT1 · · · uTi−1 uTi+1 · · · uTk
]T
, with similar definitions
for γs\i, û\i, and [Lghj,s(x)]\i. With the above definitions, we can now state a limited
communication analogue for the admissible control space in (1.7). In analogy with
the admissible control space in (1.7), the limited communication admissible control
space for constraint j (j = 1, . . . , q) and vehicle i (i ∈ Vj) is defined as
Kji (x) =
{











Notice that the constraint of Kji (x) is the same as the constraint κ1(x, u1) ≥ 0 in
(4.3) when i = 1 and k = 2 so that it is a generalization of the situation when
there are two vehicles. However, Kji only encodes controls that satisfy one safety
constraint so we now take the intersection over all j where aircraft i affects the jth





i(x). Although Ki(x) is the set admissible controls that encode safety
for all constraints, it is only specific to one aircraft, namely aircraft i. We therefore
concatenate the vectors to arrive at a set of admissible controls similar that results in





uT1 · · · uTk
]T
∈ U : ui ∈ Ki(x) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
}
.
We now show that K(x) can be used in a similar way as K∩(x) was used in Theorem 3
for ensuring safety.
Theorem 4. Given a dynamical system (1.3) and a set C∩ ⊂ D∩ defined in (3.5) for
q continuously differentiable functions hj defined in (3.7) with safety functions ρj
and evading maneuvers γj where k ∈ {1, . . . , q}, if hj is a ZCBF for k ∈ {1, . . . , q}
and Assumption 1 holds then ∀x ∈ D∩, K(x) ⊆ K∩(x). Further, K(x) is non-empty
for all x ∈ C∩. If in addition, γs maps to the interior of U and for all x ∈ ∂C∩,
⟨[Lghj1(x)]i, [Lghj2(x)]i⟩ > 0 for j = 1, . . . , q and i = 1, . . . , k and j1 ̸= j2 and
j1, j2 ∈ {1, . . . , q}, then there is an open set that is a superset of C∩ for which K(x)
is non-empty for all x in the open set.
Proof. For the first statement, assume u ∈ K(x) so that ui ∈ Ki(x) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
This means that Aiui ≥ bi so that, because A is block diagonal, Au ≥ b. Further, it
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means that for any constraint j = 1, . . . , q and any i ∈ Vj,










































= (|Vj| − 1)Lghj,s(x)γs(x). (4.9)
Summing (4.7) over i ∈ Vj and using (4.8) and (4.9) yields










Since this is true for all j = 1, . . . , q, u ∈ K∩(x). Then K(x) ⊆ K∩(x) for all x ∈ C∩.
Consider now the second statement, namely that γs ∈ K(x). For j = 1, . . . , q,
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The inequality is true because x ∈ C∩ implies α(hj,s(x)) ≥ 0. See the proof for
Theorem 2 for why Lfhj,s(x)+Lghj,s(x)γs(x) ≥ 0. Then γsi ∈ K
j
i for any j = 1, . . . , q
and i ∈ Vj. Then γsi ∈ Ki. Then γs(x) ∈ K(x).
Finally, the last statement where K(x) is nonempty for all x in an open set that
is a superset of C∩ follows similarly to the proof of Theorem 3.
Theorem 4 means that each aircraft can choose its control value to be in Ki(x)
because the resulting control value across all aircraft will be in K(x) which is a subset
of K∩(x). Further, because of the shared evading maneuver assumption, Ki(x) will
always be non-empty. This allows us to then write a QP similar to (3.12) but without





∥ui − ûi∥2 (4.10)
















≥ 0 j ∈ Si.
.
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4.3 A Comparison of Safety With and Without Communication
We note that the solution from the centralized QP (3.12) may be different than the
solution from the limited communication QPs (4.10) because K(x) may be a strict
subset of K∩(x). To see this, let k = 2, q = 1, Lfh(x) = 0, α(h(x)) = 0, m1 = m2 = 1,
[Lgh(x)]2γ
s
2(x) = −1, and [Lgh(x)]1γs1(x) = 1. Then the barrier function constraint
in (4.10) becomes [Lgh(x)]1u1 ≥ 1, while the barrier function constraint in (3.12)
becomes Lgh(x)u ≥ 0. Since u1 = 0 is feasible for the latter but not the former
equation, we do not have that K(x) = K∩(x). Because K(x) ⊂ K∩(x), it may be
that the total cost of each vehicle calculating (4.10) is higher than the centralized
calculation (3.12). In other words, the calculated safe control may not be as close
to the nominal control signal in a least squares sense when using (4.10) as opposed
to (3.12). Nevertheless, in either case of (3.12) or (4.10), a solution exists to the
corresponding QP such that u ∈ K∩.
Although a specific example has been given to show that K(x) can be a strict
subset of K∩(x), consider more generally why this is the case by analyzing (4.2)
again. The generalization of this equation is the sum over Vj of equation (4.7) but
for simplicity we consider (4.2) and note the same conclusion holds in the more
general case. Note then that in the limited communication case where vehicle 1 does
not know u2 and vehicle 2 does not know u1 that in order to ensure the inequality
holds, we must require that κ1(x, u1) ≥ 0 and κ2(x, u2) ≥ 0. However, when there
is unlimited communication, we only need to have that κ1(x, u1) + κ2(x, u2) ≥ 0. In
other words, when there is unlimited communication, we can have that κ1(x, u1) <
0 or κ2(x, u2) < 0 provided that their sum is positive. This means that limited
communication is introducing an additional constraint on the set of available control
inputs and it is therefore not surprising that the set of controls that satisfies the
safety constraint using limited communication, namely K(x), is smaller than the set
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of controls that satisfy the safety constraint when there is unlimited communication,
namely K∩(x).
Another difference between the limited communication (4.10) and the centralized
(3.12) QPs is how the size of the optimization variable and number of constraints
vary with the number of vehicles k. In the centralized approach (3.12) the size of
the optimization variable grows linearly with k while the number of constraints grows
quadratically. On the other hand, in the limited communication QP (4.10), the
size of the optimization variable and number of constraints are constant and linear,
respectively.
4.4 Simulation of 20 Vehicles With Limited Communication
We now repeat the scenario discussed in Section 2.5 but consider k = 20 vehicles. For
the scenario where h is constructed from γturn, we use
[
v ω 0 v ω 0
]T
where
v = 0.9vmin + 0.1vmax and ω = 0.9ωmax. For the scenario where h is constructed
from γstraight, we let γi =
[
(1 + 0.01i)v 0 0
]T
so that each vehicle uses a different
translational velocity as is required to ensure differentiability of h (see Section 2.3.2).
Note that this does not violate the shared evading maneuver assumption because
γs =
[
(γ1)T · · · (γk)T
]T
. Additionally, we let ψ = 0 and ψ = 25◦ in the scenario
where h is constructed from γturn and γstraight, respectively. Offsetting the initial
orientation 25◦ from pointing at the origin is required so that the vehicles can start in
the safe set when using γstraight. Screenshots for the case of γturn and γstraight are shown
in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. A video of the resulting behavior is available in
[65]. Quantitative results for both scenarios are shown in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 which
shows similar outputs to the results for the two vehicle simulation shown in Figures 2.4
and 2.5. We also compare the approach of this paper to a navigation function from [7]
in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. Note that when using a navigation function the vehicles begin
the evasive maneuver earlier than when the collision avoidance algorithm is based on
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Table 4.1: A list of assumptions required to ensure system safety after adding the
shared evading maneuver and removing the need to communicate control values.
Assumption Effect of Removing Assumption
One Safety Constraint still safe but additional assumption required (shared
evading maneuver)
Unlimited Communication still safe but overriding control value may deviate
more significantly from nominal control value
Infinite Range Sensors see Chapter 5
Known Dynamics Model see Chapter 6
a barrier function constructed from γturn. Using a less aggressive α function, such
as a linear function with a small coefficient instead of a cubic function, may have
caused the behavior from the barrier function override to similarly override earlier.
A comparison of potential and barrier functions can also be found in [66]. Also note
that the pairwise distance between all vehicles are kept above the minimum safety
distance Ds while satisfying actuator constraints.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we investigated a practical implementation consideration involving
limited communication. We found that implementing Theorem 3 in the QP (3.12)
required both infinite range sensing and high frequency communication of control
values between aircraft. By splitting the safety constraint into groups of values that
only depend on individual aircraft, we were able to reformulate the QP (3.12) to
only depend on individual aircraft control values. This means we can ensure system
safety without requiring the overhead of frequent communication of low level control
values. However, we also find that while safety can be ensured, it may be that the
resulting overriding control value may deviate more significantly from the nominal
control value than when allowing for more communication. The summary of this





Figure 4.1: A demonstration of 20 fixed-wing vehicles applying barrier functions
to ensure collisions are avoided when constructing h defined in (2.3) by γturn. (a)
The starting position of 20 vehicles. (b) The vehicles approach the origin and begin
avoidance behavior around 50 meters away from the origin. (c) The vehicles circle




Figure 4.2: A demonstration of 20 fixed-wing vehicles applying barrier functions to
ensure collisions are avoided when constructing h defined in (2.3) by γstraight. (a)
The starting position of 20 vehicles. (b) The vehicles approach the origin and begin
avoidance behavior around 50 meters away from the origin. (c) The vehicles circle
the origin. (d) The vehicles reach approach their target position. The asymmetry
is due to the fact that the vehicles have different speeds for their nominal evading
maneuvers. As the speed for the nominal maneuvers approaches the same value the
result is a more symmetric pattern.
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Figure 4.3: Control outputs for the scenario with 20 fixed-wing vehicles. The blue
dashed and orange solid lines are the output of the scenario where h is constructed
from γstraight and γturn, respectively. The green dotted line is the output from using
a navigation function. Vehicle 1 velocity and turn rates are shown to be within
the actuator limits in (a), (b), and (c) for velocity, turn rate, and altitude rate,
respectively. The navigation function starts avoiding a collision well in advance of
when using h constructed from γturn.
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Figure 4.4: Outputs for the scenario with 20 fixed-wing vehicles. The blue dashed and
orange solid lines are the output of the scenario where h is constructed from γstraight
and γturn, respectively. The green dotted line is the output from using a navigation
function. Vehicle 1 is plotted as a representative output since all 20 vehicles cannot
be shown on the same plot. In (c), the minimum distance between any two vehicles
is shown to be above Ds. (d) is the path taken by vehicle 1. Note that the behavior
is significantly different when constructing h with γturn and γstraight. The navigation




SAFETY WITH LIMITED RANGE SENSORS
5.1 Introduction
Chapters 3 and 4 relaxed two assumptions from Chapter 2, namely that there was
only one safety objective to be satisfied at all times and that the vehicles could
communicate high numbers of messages, respectively. In this chapter we relax another
assumption, namely that the vehicles can sense each other at all times. Recall the
discussion at the beginning of the last chapter, where we noted that to calculate a
safe control value, the vehicles must know the shared evading maneuver, the safety
objectives, the nominal control value, and the state. The last chapter removed the
need to know the nominal control value of other vehicles. This chapter removes the
need to always know the state. In particular, we consider safety when the state is not
known at all times and find that in some cases we can still ensure the system stays
safe.
In the prior chapters, we have shown how to ensure a system of k UAVs maintain
safe distances for all time while taking into account dynamics constraints. However,
the discussion did not consider limited range sensing. Thus, in this chapter we relax
this limitation with the following contributions. First, we show that the barrier
functions do not necessarily guarantee safety when the UAVs are subject to limited
range sensing. Second, we introduce a method for constructing a new barrier function
that accommodates limited sensing range from a previously existing barrier function
that may not necessarily accommodate limited range sensing. Finally, we conduct
an experiment consisting of a scenario of 20 fixed wing aircraft, where because of the




Figure 5.1: (left) When there is infinite sensing the car knows when to start deceler-
ating in order to avoid the wall. (right) When there is limited sensing the car might
not sense the wall until it is too late.
even though the vehicles are subject to limited range sensing.
5.2 Motivation
Recall the car example of Figure 1.1 where a car starts some distance from the wall.
Given its current position and velocity, we specify an evasive maneuver to maximally
accelerate away from the wall, forward propagate under this hypothetical control
action, and let the barrier function be the closest distance the vehicle gets to the wall
under this forward propagation. Consider then when the car has a limited sensing
range due to lighting conditions. If the sensing range becomes too small to stop
after initially sensing the wall then collision avoidance can no longer be guaranteed
(see Figure 5.1). We further motivate this idea with specific examples from collision
avoidance for fixed-wing aircraft.
We assume there is a sensor modeled via a set S ⊂ D such that, if the system state
x is such that x ∈ S, then x is completely known to both vehicles, whereas if x ̸∈ S,
then all that is known is that x ̸∈ S. In the case of UAV collision avoidance where
each UAV is equipped with an omnidirectional sensor with range R, S = {x ∈ D :
d1,2(x) ≤ R2}. In this section we present two motivating examples to illustrate two
distinct issues that can arise when using barrier functions in the presence of limited
range sensing. In both cases, the critical problem is that K(x) cannot be calculated
65
for all x ∈ D because S ⊂ D.
The first issue that limited range sensing introduces is that that safety can no
longer be guaranteed. In particular, we construct a scenario where h(x(0)) ≥ 0 and,
because K(x) cannot be calculated, there is a future time for which h(x(t)) < 0. In
other words, we can have a continuously differentiable barrier function h that satisfies
(1.5) but still not be able to guarantee safety. The second issue we examine is that
there can be discontinuities in actuator commands even though h is continuously dif-
ferentiable. This can cause alarm or discomfort for systems designed to ensure safety
of human passengers (e.g., cruise control [4]). In the following examples, consider two
UAVs equipped with omnidirectional sensors (e.g. radar) of radius R, with dynamics
governed by a nominal controller û(x). See Figure 5.2 for illustrations.
Example 3. A Barrier Function Without a Safety Guarantee. Suppose the two vehicles
start at x1(0) =
[




−r2 −R/2 r2 −π/2 0
]T
,









so that they both follow
a circular trajectory with radius r1 = v1/ω and r2/ω, respectively (see Figure 5.2a).
Then hstraight(x(0)) = (r1+r2+R)−Ds ≥ 0 as long as R ≥ max(0, Ds−r1−r2) so the
vehicles start safe according to hstraight. Further, note that because the vehicles cannot
sense each other, K(x) cannot be calculated. This is because to calculate K(x), the
values of Lfh(x), Lgh(x), and h(x) are required. Because K(x) cannot be calculated,
there is no means to ensure that the control input applied to the vehicle will be in
K(x). In particular, it means that it is unknown whether the nominal control input û
is in K(x) and a design decision must be employed for what actuation input to apply
to the vehicles. If the design decision is, for instance, to apply the nominal controller
to the vehicles then the vehicles will reach
[




−R/2 0 0 0
]T
,




Figure 5.2: Two examples where limited range sensing creates issues when applying
barrier functions to fixed-wing aircraft collision avoidance. In (a), the vehicles start
so that hstraight(x) = (r1+r2+R)−Ds ≥ 0 but because the vehicles cannot sense each
other, achieve a configuration where hstraight(x) = −Ds. In (b), the vehicles travel
along the x-axis until they sense each other at a distance of R apart, at which point
the safe control implied by hturn requires high turn speed. Adapted with permission
from [67] ©2021 IEEE.
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means that the vehicles started in a state x such that h(x(0)) ≥ 0 but there exists
a later time t such that h(x(t)) < 0. This is because K(x) cannot be calculated for
x /∈ S so the control input applied to the aircraft does not always satisfy (1.5). In
other words, because K(x) cannot be calculated for all x ∈ D, Theorem 1 cannot be
used to guarantee safety.
Example 4. Loss of Smoothness. For hturn let γturn be specified with v = vmin and
ω = ωmax in (2.9). Let the two aircraft have sensor radius R = (Ds + 2r) cos(η) + 4δ
where r = vmin/ωmax and η = arcsin(r/(r+Ds/2)). As in Figure 5.2b, let the vehicles
have initial positions of
[
(Ds/2 + r) cos(η) + 2δ + ϵ 0 −π 0
]T
and [
−(Ds/2 + r) cos(η)− 2δ − ϵ 0 0 0
]T
,
respectively, where ϵ > 0. See Figure 5.3 for the geometric setup. Further, let each
aircraft have a nominal trajectory that continues toward the origin. Because the
aircraft cannot sense each other, K(x) cannot be calculated. This means that there
will be no collision avoidance override so the applied actuator command will be equal




until the vehicles reach
states [
(Ds/2 + r) cos(η) + 2δ 0 −π 0
]T
and [
−(Ds/2 + r) cos(η)− 2δ 0 0 0
]T
,
respectively. At this point, the vehicles can sense each other and the constraints (1.5)
in the QP (1.10) can be calculated, resulting in a discontinuity in the constraint in
the QP (1.10).
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Figure 5.3: The geometric setup for the chosen variables for Example 4.
5.3 Constructing a Barrier Function for Safety Guarantees Despite Limited Range
Sensing Restrictions
In Section 5.2 we saw that limited range sensing can lead to practical issues including
the loss of safety guarantees even when a ZCBF, h, exists for the system. This means
that UAVs may collide with each other when they are equipped with limited range
sensors. When limited sensing is not taken into account in the design of a ZCBF h,
the problem is that values of h cannot be evaluated for all x ∈ D, as required by
Definition 1, and so h cannot be used to guarantee safety. In this section we provide
a solution to this issue.
Definition 3. For a given ZCBF h and a sensor with a sensor set S, h is sensor
compatible if h is a positive constant for all x /∈ S.
Remark 6. A sensor compatible ZCBF h must be positive outside S since otherwise
this would imply for x /∈ S that (1.5) becomes α(h(x)) < 0 so (1.5) does not hold for
any u ∈ U .
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Importantly, implementing a safety overriding controller requires an exact calcu-
lation of the ZCBF constraint (1.5) only if K(x) ̸= U . When K(x) = U , there is no
need to calculate h(x) or its derivatives because any u ∈ U is already known to be
safe. Because of the additional structure on a sensor compatible ZCBF, we can relax
the need to check u ∈ K(x) for all x ∈ D in Theorem 1 because it is already known
that u ∈ K(x) for all u when x /∈ S, as is made precise in the following Corollary.
Corollary 2. Suppose h is a sensor compatible ZCBF. Then any Lipschitz continuous
controller u : D → U such that u(x) ∈ K(x) for all x ∈ S will render the set C
forward invariant.
Proof. By assumption u(x) ∈ K(x) for all x ∈ S. Suppose then that x /∈ S so that
h(x) is a positive constant. Then K(x) = U since Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)u + α(h(x)) =
α(h(x)) > 0 is satisfied for all u ∈ U . Hence u(x) ∈ K(x) for all x ∈ D so the
assumptions of Theorem 1 are satisfied.
Remark 7. The difference between Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 is that the condition
u(x) ∈ K(x) only needs to be the case for x ∈ S rather than x ∈ D due to the extra
structure on a sensor compatible ZCBF. This is an important distinction because
when there are sensing limitations, it may not be possible to calculate K(x) for all
x ∈ D.
Remark 8. For an arbitrary sensor, neither hstraight nor hturn are necessarily sensor
compatible. To see this for hstraight, let R > 0, x1 =
[





−R + ϵ 0 0 0
]T
. Then x /∈ S for ϵ > 0 and in this case h(x) = 0. However,
if x2 =
[
−R + ϵ −Ds 0 0
]T
, then x /∈ S but h(x) = Ds. Then hstraight is not
sensor compatible because h(x) is not constant for all x /∈ S. A similar calculation
can be done to show hturn is not sensor compatible. Hence, we cannot always apply
Corollary 2 to hstraight or hturn when there is limited range sensing.
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Consider now some ZCBF h that is not necessarily sensor compatible. We now
show how to create h̃ from h so that h̃ is sensor compatible even though this is not
the case for h. This allows us to be able to apply Corollary 2 to h̃. However, it is not
always possible to create h̃ from h so that h̃ is sensor compatible and we therefore
consider two cases. First, although hturn is not necessarily sensor compatible for
an arbitrary sensor, we give sufficient conditions to construct a ZCBF to be sensor
compatible. Second, we show how to verify when it is impossible to construct a sensor
compatible ZCBF using the proposed method. We show this is the case for hstraight.
To construct h̃, we first introduce an interpolation function to ensure that h̃
is continuously differentiable, as required by the definition of a ZCBF. Let ξ > 0,
0 < β < 1, and ψ be a continuously differentiable, non-decreasing, real valued function
on an open set including [βξ, ξ] chosen to satisfy
ψ(βξ) = βξ
ψ′(βξ) = 1
ψ′(ξ) = 0. (5.1)
Example 5. An example of such a function ψ can be found by fitting a quadratic
function. Let ψ(η) = c1η2 + c2η + c3. Then (5.1) can be solved for c1 = −12ξ(1−β) ,
c2 = −2ξc1, and c3 = βξ − c1(βξ)2 − c2βξ.
We now define h̃ as follows
h̃(x) =

h(x) h(x) ≤ βξ
ψ(h(x)) βξ < h(x) < ξ
ψ(ξ) ξ ≤ h(x)
(5.2)
where we let Bξ = {x ∈ D : h(x) ≤ ξ} be a sub-level set of h (see Fig 5.4), where
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ξ denotes the maximum value of h for which the safety constraint affects the value
of h̃. Bξ is the set of states where the safety constraint affects the value of h̃. β is a
mixing term for states where βξ < h(x) < ξ and exists to ensure the differentiability
of h̃.
Remark 9. With this setup, we can take the following steps to show when a ZCBF
h̃ is sensor compatible. First, the system designer chooses ξ which determines Bξ.
Second, the system designer determines if Bξ ⊆ S. In other words, ξ > 0 must be
chosen with the sensing range in mind in order to verify that Bξ ⊆ S. The second
step verifies that a sensor exists so that any value of h(x) such that h(x) < ξ can
be calculated. Since h̃ does not require knowledge of x for h(x) ≥ ξ, h̃(x) can be
calculated for all x ∈ D. We prove this intuition below. Note that when multiple ξ
satisfy the above steps, it may be preferable to select larger ξ because h(x) = h̃(x)
for all x ∈ D such that h(x) ≤ βξ.
Lemma 1. Assume h defined in (2.3) is a ZCBF where γ is locally Lipschitz. Let h̃
be defined as in (5.2). Then h̃ is a ZCBF on D.
Proof. Note that because of how ψ is defined and because h is a continuously differ-
entiable function, that h̃ is a continuously differentiable function. Also note that for
βξ < h(x) < ξ, ψ(h(x)) > 0 since ψ is a non-decreasing function that is positive at
βξ.
To show that h̃ satisfies (1.5), let x ∈ D. We consider three cases. First, if
h(x) ≤ βξ then the inequality (1.5) holds for h̃(x) because h(x) is a ZCBF. If h(x) ≥ ξ
then (1.5) for h̃(x) becomes α(ψ(ξ)) ≥ 0 which is true for all u ∈ U because ψ(ξ) > 0
and α is a class K function. Finally, suppose βξ < h(x) < ξ and note that because ψ
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Figure 5.4: A graphical view of a hypothetical barrier function h (blue) along with h̃
(orange) of a one-dimensional system. Given h, the system designer’s choice of ξ and
β defines h̃ and Bξ. According to Theorem 5 when the system designer can identify
a ξ > 0 that defines Bξ where Bξ ⊆ S, h̃ is a ZCBF compatible with a sensor s.
Adapted with permission from [67] ©2021 IEEE.
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is non-decreasing that ∂ψ(h(x))
∂h(x)
≥ 0. Then




(Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)γ(x)) + α(ψ(h(x)))
≥ 0.
The first line uses the chain rule. The second line uses the fact that ∂ψ(h(x))
∂h(x)
≥ 0 and
that Lfh(x)+Lgh(x)γ(x) ≥ 0, as was established in the proof of Theorem 2. Finally,
note that α(ψ(h(x))) ≥ 0 because ψ(h(x)) > 0 and α is a class K function. Then h̃
is a ZCBF.
Theorem 5. For a given sensor S, assume h defined in (2.3) is a ZCBF where γ is
locally Lipschitz and there exists a ξ > 0 such that Bξ ⊆ S. Then h̃ defined in (5.2)
is a sensor compatible ZCBF.
Proof. h̃ is a ZCBF by Lemma 1. Suppose x /∈ S. Then because Bξ ⊆ S, h(x) > ξ so
h̃(x) = ψ(ξ). Then h̃ is a positive constant for all x /∈ S and is sensor compatible.
Theorem 5 is the justification of the steps listed in Remark 9. Combined with
Corollary 2, Theorem 5 states how the forward invariance of a set C can be guaranteed
even though there is limited range sensing. However, it is predicated on finding a
ξ > 0 that defines a sublevel set Bξ for which Bξ ⊆ S. We now give an example of
such a case for fixed wing collision avoidance where each aircraft is equipped with an
omnidirectional sensor with a given range R.
Example 6. It was shown in Remark 8 that hturn is not necessarily sensor compatible
for an arbitrary sensor. We now use Theorem 5 to define sensing requirements so that
we can create h̃ from hturn so that h̃ is sensor compatible. For hturn, the trajectory
defined in (2.4) is a circle for each aircraft with radius r1 = σv/ω and r2 = v/ω,
respectively. Let ∆x(t) = p1,x(t) − p2,x(t), and ∆y(t) = p1,y(t) − p2,y(t), so that the
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vehicles start at a planar distance of (∆x2(t)+∆y2(t))1/2 from each other. Assuming
the planar distance between the vehicles, (∆x2(t)+∆y2(t))1/2, is greater than 2(r1 +
r2), the closest the distance can be along the trajectory (2.4) is d1,2(x(0))1/2−2r1−2r2.
Assume each vehicle has an omnidirectional sensor with range R large enough so
that (
(R− 2r1 − 2r2)2 − 4δ
)1/2 −Ds > 0. (5.3)
Equation (5.3) implies S for this example. Having defined the sensing limitations
for this problem, we now follow the steps in Remark 9 to show that h̃ is a sensor
compatible ZCBF. First, we choose ξ so that we can prove Bξ ⊆ S, namely
(
(R− 2r1 − 2r2)2 − 4δ
)1/2 −Ds = ξ > 0. (5.4)
Second, we show that Bξ ⊆ S. Suppose x(t) /∈ S so that d1,2(x(t)) > R2. Then




≥ ((d1,2(x(0))1/2 − 2r1 − 2r2)2 − 4δ)1/2 −Ds
> ((R− 2r1 − 2r2)2 − 4δ)1/2 −Ds
= ξ
> 0.
Then x(t) /∈ Bξ. Then Bξ ⊆ S. In other words, given a sensor of radius R, we
can choose ξ according to (5.4) and use h̃ defined in (5.2) to ensure safe operations
between two fixed wing aircraft.
While Example 6 showed how to use hturn with Theorem 5, the same cannot be
done for hstraight (see Figure 5.5).
Corollary 3. Assume h defined in (2.3) is a ZCBF where γ is locally Lipschitz. Suppose
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Figure 5.5: Theorem 5 can be used to calculate specify precise sensing range require-
ments to ensure safety guarantees but there is no finite range sensor for which the
same can be done for hstraight.
there exists an x ∈ D such that h(x) < 0 and x /∈ S. Then for all ξ > 0, Bξ ̸⊆ S.
Proof. Note that for the given x, x ∈ Bξ for any ξ > 0 since h(x) < 0. Then x ∈ Bξ
but x ̸∈ S.
Remark 10. We now use Corollary 3 to show hstraight cannot be used with Theorem 5
to guarantee safety. Let x1(0) =
[




R/2 + ϵ 0 π 0
]T
,
the sensing radius be R, and ϵ > 0, Then h(x) = −Ds and x ̸∈ S since the vehicles
are further than R apart.
5.4 An Interpretation of h̃ As a More Permissive ZCBF Than h
Consider again Theorem 5, which gives sufficient conditions to guarantee safety even
though the state cannot always be sensed. The key idea that leads to Theorem 5
is the construction of a barrier function h̃ that is constant for the set of states that
cannot be sensed. In other words, the coefficient on u in equation (1.5) is zero so any
u satisfying the actuator constraints also satisfies the safety constraint. This means
that if the nominal controller is within the actuator constraints that there will be no
safety override to alter the nominal control value. What we should expect in this case
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is that the state can approach the safety boundary more quickly than if there were
not any sensing restrictions. In this section we make this intuition precise by showing
the conditions for which using h̃ as the barrier function is at least as permissive as
the original barrier function h.
Consider a ZCBF h that is not necessarily sensor compatible but for which it is
possible to construct h̃ so that h̃ is a sensor compatible ZCBF. In this section we
characterize how h̃ is more permissive than h. For notational convenience we denote
∇hψ(h(x)) = ∂ψ(h(x))∂h(x) and assume the following.
Assumption 2. Assume on (βξ, ξ), α is continuously differentiable. Further, assume
the derivative of α is non-increasing on (βξ, ξ).
Remark 11. The assumptions on α can be satisfied for any α that is linear on the
region (βξ, ξ).
Assumption 3. Assume the domain of ψ is extended by letting ψ be the identity
function for inputs h(x) < βξ. Further, assume the first derivative of ψ is strictly
positive but non-increasing on (βξ, ξ) and the second derivative of ψ is negative on
(βξ, ξ).
Remark 12. Note that because the first derivative of ψ is strictly positive for h(x) < ξ,
(∇hψ(h(x)))−1 is well defined on h(x) < ξ.
Remark 13. The ψ discussed in Example 5 satisfies Assumption 3 by letting ψ(h(x)) =
h(x) for h(x) ≤ βξ.
We begin by expanding the barrier condition (1) for h̃ in terms of h. This will then
be used to show the conditions such that K(x) ⊆ K̃(x) where K̃(x) is the admissible
control space of h̃ at x. Under Assumption 3 and noting Remark 12, for h(x) < ξ we
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have for x ∈ D that
Lf h̃(x) + Lgh̃(x)u+ α(h̃(x))







Then because ∇hψ(h(x)) > 0 and letting
α2(h(x)) = (∇hψ(h(x)))−1α(ψ(h(x))), (5.5)
we have, letting sgn be the sign of the expression,
sgn(Lf h̃(x) + Lgh̃(x)u+ α(h̃(x))) (5.6)
= sgn(Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)u+ α2(h(x))).
Lemma 2. Suppose h is a ZCBF, let h̃ be as defined in (5.2), let Assumptions 2 and 3
hold, and let α2 be as defined in (5.5). If h(x) < ξ then α2(h(x)) ≥ α(h(x)).
Proof. Suppose h(x) ≤ βξ. Then because ψ(h(x)) = h(x), α2(h(x)) = α(h(x)).
Suppose now that βξ < h(x) < ξ. We prove α2(h(x)) ≥ α(h(x)) with the comparison
lemma [68].
It has already been shown that α2(h(x)) = α(h(x)) at h(x) = βξ. We now show
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The inequality holds because the second derivative of ψ is negative and α(ψ(h(x)) ≥ 0
for h(x) ∈ (βξ, ξ). We must now show that ∇ψα(ψ(h(x))) ≥ ∇hα(h(x)) to conclude
that α2(h(x)) ≥ α(h(x)) for h(x) ∈ (βξ, ξ).
Because ψ(h(x)) = h(x) for h(x) = βξ, the first derivative of ψ is 1 at h(x) = βξ
and the first derivative is non-increasing on h(x) ∈ (βξ, ξ), so ψ(h(x)) ≤ h(x) for
h(x) ∈ (βξ, ξ). Then because the derivative of α is non-increasing for h(x) ∈ (βξ, ξ),
∇ψα(ψ(h(x)) ≥ ∇hα(h(x)).
Remark 14. Note that α2 is a class K function. By definition, α2(0) = 0 and is
strictly increasing on (0, βξ). To see that α2 is strictly increasing on (βξ, ξ), note
that it has already been proven that ∇hα2(h(x)) ≥ ∇ψα(ψ(h(x))) ≥ ∇hα(h(x)).
Further ∇hα(h(x)) > 0 since α is a class K function. Then ∇hα2(h(x)) > 0.
Theorem 6. Suppose h is a ZCBF, assume h̃ be as defined in (5.2) is sensor compatible,
and let Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. Then K(x) ⊆ K̃(x) for all x ∈ D.
Proof. Suppose x is such that h(x) < ξ and u ∈ K(x). Then Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)u +
α(h(x)) ≥ 0. Then since α2(h(x)) ≥ α(h(x)) from Lemma 2 we have Lfh(x) +
Lfh(x)u + α2(h(x)) ≥ 0. Then from (5.6), Lf h̃(x) + Lgh̃(x)u + α(h̃(x)) ≥ 0. Then
u ∈ K̃(x).
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Suppose x is such that h(x) ≥ ξ and u ∈ K(x). Then because u ∈ U , u ∈ K̃(x)
since K̃(x) = U .
Remark 15. In particular, Theorem 6 gives the conditions under which any u satisfying
the QP (1.10) using h will be satisfied in a QP (1.10) when using h̃.
Theorem 6 shows the conditions under which h̃ is at least as permissive as the
original barrier function h. This means a safety override based on h̃ will be less
invasive than a barrier function based on h. However, it is important to ask whether
this is something a system designer actually wants. In particular, we generally want
to take small overriding actions when the state is not yet close to the safety boundary
in order in case there is noise in the modeling or sensors. This is the role of α in (1.5).
In other words, when using h with unlimited sensing, the safety overriding con-
troller will start to take action when the system is further from the safety boundary.
When there is a loss of sensing outside some radius, the state can travel arbitrarily
quickly (within actuator limits) towards the boundary. Although safety can still be
guaranteed in this case, it may involve approaching the boundary more quickly than
desired. Incorporating longer range sensors directly solves this issue but if this is not
possible, this discussion implies introducing additional conservatism elsewhere may
be desirable. Examples of where additional conservatism can be introduced are in α,
the evading maneuver, or adding artificial actuator limits. For instance, instead of
using cubic α, a linear alpha with a small coefficient may be preferable. Similarly, as
discussed in Chapter 2 it may be preferable to choose an evasive maneuver well within
the actuator limits so there is significant room to deviate from the modeled evasive
maneuver. This was shown to be important for a ZCBF to satisfy (1.5) outside of
the safe set in the proof of Theorem 2. Finally, by adding artificial actuator limits
(e.g., limiting the actual speed of the aircraft to something much smaller than vmax)
can also reduce how quickly the vehicles approach the safety boundary.
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5.5 Simulation Experiments
In this section we conduct a simulation experiment with SCRIMMAGE [59]. We
consider two vehicles with initial states of
[




200 0 π 0
]T









We use hturn, letting v = 0.9vmin + 0.1vmax and ω = 0.9ωmax in (2.9) where
vmin = 15 meters/second, vmax = 25 meters/second, δ = 0.01 meters2, and ωmax = 13
degrees/second. The choice of ωmax results from assuming a 30 degree max bank
angle while traveling at vmax and using a constant rate turn formula, as in [61].
In the first experiment, we examine the effect of sensing range on the result-
ing closest distance the vehicles experience during the simulation. In Example 6 we
showed how to apply the steps described in Remark 9 by choosing ξ so that Bξ ⊆ S
to conclude that that h̃ is sensor compatible. The conclusion required that the sens-
ing range was above a threshold in (5.3). Using the parameters of this experiment,
equation (5.3) implies R > 318.4. Because the inequality is strict, we start the exper-
iment with R = 319. As shown in Figure 5.6, provided the sensing range is above the
threshold calculated in (5.3), the vehicles are able to maintain safe distances through-
out the simulation. Further, as the sensing range approaches the limit predicted by
(5.3), the minimum distance between the vehicles during the simulation approaches
Ds.
In the second experiment we repeat the experiment of Chapter 4 where 20 vehicles
are applying a barrier function and are positioned around a circle with a nominal
controller that cause the vehicles to arrive at the origin at the same time. The
difference in this experiment from Chapter 4 is that we include a limited sensing
range of 350 for each vehicle and start the vehicles 1250 feet from the origin so they
start the scenario without being able to sense each other. A screenshot of the initial
conditions and evasive maneuver are shown in Figure 5.9 and a video simulation
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s) Min Vehicle Dist
Ds = 5
Min Allowed R
Figure 5.6: The minimum vehicle distance vs sensing range. The green dashed line
is the minimum sensing range using (5.3). Note that for all sensing ranges above the
minimum sensing range, the vehicles are able to maintain safe distances. Adapted
with permission from [67] ©2021 IEEE.
is shown in [69]. The vehicles are able to maintain safe distances throughout the
simulation.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have found that safety guarantees are still possible even when there
is limited range sensing. In order to arrive at this conclusion we construct a new
barrier function from a previously existing one and ensure the new barrier function is
constant outside the set of states that can be sensed. However, we note there are two
downsides to this process. First, for any given barrier function it is not guaranteed
that we can construct a new barrier function that can maintain safety when there is
limited sensing. This is the case for hstraight and shown more generally in Theorem 6.
Second, because the state cannot be sensed outside of a given range, the resulting
barrier function permits all control values that are within actuator constraints. The
result is that the state may approach the safety boundary more quickly than if a
longer range sensor were available. We summarize this discussion with an addition
to Table 5.1.
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Figure 5.7: Control outputs for the scenario with 20 fixed-wing vehicles subject to
limited sensing where h is constructed from γturn. Vehicle 1 velocity and turn rates are
shown to be within the actuator limits in (a), (b), and (c) for velocity, turn rate, and
altitude rate, respectively. Note that h constructed from γstraight is omitted because
it has been shown that this h is not sensor compatible.
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Figure 5.8: Outputs for the scenario with 20 fixed-wing vehicles subject to limited
sensing where h is constructed from γturn. Vehicle 1 is plotted as a representative
output since all 20 vehicles cannot be shown on the same plot. In (c), the minimum
distance between any two vehicles is shown to be above Ds. (d) is the path taken by
vehicle 1. Note that the behavior is significantly different when constructing h with
γturn and γstraight. Note that h constructed from γstraight is omitted because it has
been shown that this h is not sensor compatible.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.9: (a) A screenshot of the initial conditions of 20 vehicles whose nominal
controller will put them on a collision course through the origin. The circles around
the vehicles are the sensing range so that the vehicles cannot sense each other at the
beginning of the scenario. (b) A sideview of the aircraft as they maneuver around
each other near the origin.
Table 5.1: A list of assumptions required to ensure system safety after adding the
shared evading maneuver while removing the need to communicate and infinite range
sensing.
Assumption Effect of Removing Assumption
One Safety Constraint still safe but additional assumption required (shared
evading maneuver)
Unlimited Communication still safe but overriding control value may deviate
more significantly from nominal control value
Infinite Range Sensors only some barrier functions can be used to guarantee
safety and the state may approach the safety bound-
ary more quickly than with unlimited sensing
Known Dynamics Model see Chapter 6
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CHAPTER 6
MODEL FREE SAFETY VIA IMPLICIT EVADING MANEUVERS
Chapters 3 through 5 removed assumptions of a single safety objective, unlimited
communications, and unlimited sensing, respectively, made in Chapter 2. In particu-
lar, we found that safety could be guaranteed even when removing these assumptions.
In this chapter we look at how to increase the performance goal. We find that we can
increase performance by removing another assumption, namely that we have a known
dynamics model. The result is to another method for constructing a barrier function
that allows for a more performant system than a model based approach while still
improving on the safety of the original system.
As shown in previous chapters, barrier functions can be used to maximize the
performance of a system while satisfying a safety constraint. However, if the safety
constraint arising from the barrier function is overly restrictive then performance
can be needlessly diminished. For example, in an adaptive cruise control setting,
safety designers can choose a minimum inter-vehicle distance that the vehicle must
satisfy. Setting this minimum distance too high (e.g., hundreds of meters) will result in
excessive inter-vehicle distances where speed setpoints are difficult to achieve. In other
words, the performance goal (speed) is negatively impacted by an overly conservative
constraint (inter-vehicle distances).
In this chapter we generalize this point by demonstrating that it extends beyond
simple scalar settings like inter-vehicle distance. In particular, we consider the case of
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) collision avoidance and demonstrate that even with
a fixed minimum inter-vehicle safety distance, the observed behavior of the safety
override resulting from a barrier function can be needlessly conservative. Specifically,
we first consider the case where the barrier function safety constraint ensures each
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vehicle can maintain a straight trajectory without a future collision. We show in this
case that even when the vehicles are arbitrarily far apart that the barrier function
indicates the vehicles are unsafe. This can result in significant performance implica-
tions on a waypoint-following UAV. To see this, consider another vehicle located far
away and its effect on how well our own vehicle achieves its waypoints. The other
vehicle could orient itself in a way that makes the barrier function imply an override
is needed. This can make the system more unpredictable as non-local factors (e.g.,
vehicles far away) can have significant impact on the control choices. Further, it could
even be exploited by malevolent actors who could conceivably choose to orient their
own aircraft in a way that forces the waypoint-following aircraft to adjust and move
in a way that a malevolent actor intends.
However, the concerns go further than that. We therefore consider a second case
where a barrier function ensures the vehicles can employ a turning maneuver to main-
tain safe distances for all future time. However, in this case we construct a scenario
where the nominal controller, a controller designed for a performance objective like
waypoint following but that does not ensure safety, would result in inter-vehicle dis-
tances many times greater than the minimum safety threshold. Nevertheless, when
an override from a barrier function is employed, the vehicles significantly alter their
course in a way that causes them to barely exceed the minimum safety distance from
each other. In other words, not only does the safety override needlessly alter the
original system’s control value, significantly reducing system performance, in doing
so it also causes the vehicles to barely exceed the safety thresholds. Further, it can
reduce trust in a system as observers see the safety override causing the system to fly
needlessly close to the other vehicle.
Prior work has investigated how to relax the invasiveness of an override while
ensuring that the system is always safe, often looking at how to construct a barrier
function that specifically accounts for the nominal controller. For instance, in [50]
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the authors introduce an optimization to maximize the set of safe states that are
compatible with a region of attraction so that the safety constraint considers the
performance objective. Similarly, an action policy and barrier function are learned
simultaneously in [70]. Imitation learning has also been employed as in [71] where
a barrier function is constructed from expert trajectories where the expert is able to
consider both performance and safety factors. More broadly, barrier functions have
also been used to not only enforce safety constraints but also guide exploration in
[72] via off policy reinforcement learning. Similarly, in [73] the authors introduce a
barrier function to constrain the policy update in reinforcement learning.
In this chapter, rather than simultaneously training both the nominal controller
and safety override, we instead seek to maximize the set of safe controls available that
could be applied to any nominal policy. This allows for a separation of concerns that
simplifies the controller design process [42]– the nominal controller can be designed
for performance while the safety override resulting from the barrier function overrides
the nominal controller as little as possible while improving safety. In particular, we
show that maximizing the set of safe states is not enough to ensure that a safety
override is not restrictive. In other words, given a state that is safe for two different
barrier functions, it may be that the available set of controls to keep the system safe
is larger for a barrier function that has a smaller overall safe set.
We also construct a barrier function without requiring a dynamics model. A ben-
efit of this is that it reduces the model mismatch that can occur when using simpli-
fied modeling assumptions (e.g., assuming linearity in the control input even though
aircraft are subject to 6-DOF dynamics) that can lead to differences in simulated
versus real-world performance. It has been more broadly discussed that model-free
approaches can often outperform model-based systems [9] as they are less restricted
in fitting to data. Thus, we propose model free barrier functions, which are learned
from interactions with the environment, to reduce how much the system is overrid-
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den. This chapter makes the following contributions. First, we motivate model free
barrier functions with examples from fixed wing collision avoidance that demonstrates
a model based approach induces unnecessary overrides. Second, we derive model free
barrier functions. Third, we demonstrate the approach in simulation.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 introduces the background for
barrier functions. Section 6.2 derives model free barrier functions. Section 6.3 demon-
strates the algorithm in simulation.
6.1 Background
In this section we introduce barrier functions in the context of discrete time [74] and
compare model-free with model-based barrier functions. Thus we introduce a UAV
dynamics model for two UAVs indexed by i (i ∈ {1, 2}) where the state for each UAV
at time k is given by xk,i =
[
pk,i,x pk,i,y θk,i pk,i,z
]T
. The components pk,i,x, pk,i,y,
and pk,i,z are the x, y, and z position of aircraft i and θk,i is the orientation. The
discrete time dynamics are given by
xk+1,i =

pk,i,x + vk,i cos θk,i∆t




where vk,i is the translational velocity, ωk,i is the rotational velocity, ζk,i is the vertical
velocity, and ∆t is a integration step parameter. These velocities serve as control
inputs and are subject to actuator limits vmin and vmax where vmin > 0, |ωk,i| ≤





has dynamics of the form
xk+1 = f(xk, uk) (6.1)
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where xk ∈ Rn, uk ∈ U ⊂ Rm, and U is the set of available controls for the system.
In [74] the authors consider dynamics of the form (6.1) to develop barrier functions
for discrete time systems which we briefly summarize here. Let h : Rn → R be an
output function of the state and define the safe set C as a superlevel set of h so that
C = {xk ∈ Rn : h(xk) ≥ 0}. (6.2)
We also let ∆h(xk, uk) = h(xk+1) − h(xk). When the output function h satisfies the
following property it can be used to ensure that if the state starts in C then it will
stay in C for all future time. The following definition is an adaptation from Definition
4 of [74] using terminology similar to that in [4].
Definition 4. A map h : Rn → R is a Discrete-Time Exponential Control Barrier
Function (DT-ECBF) on a set D where C ⊆ D if there exists a control input uk ∈ Rm
and λ such that
∆h(x, u) + λh(x) ≥ 0 (6.3)
and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 for all x ∈ D.
We therefore define the admissible control space as
K(xk) = {u ∈ U : ∆h(xk, uk) + λh(xk) ≥ 0}. (6.4)
The following is an adaptation from Proposition 4 of [74] using the terminology
of an admissible control space from [4].
Proposition 2. Given a set C ⊂ Rn defined in (6.2) for an output function h, if h is a
DT-ECBF on D then any controller u : Rn → U such that u(x) ∈ K(x) for all x ∈ D
will render the set C forward invariant.
Assuming the system has a controller designed to achieve a performance goal that
does not necessarily ensure safety, barrier functions can be used to select a control
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s.t. u ∈ U
u ∈ K(x).
As discussed in [74], equation (6.5) is a nonconvex program which can be difficult
to solve in real-time. We resolve this runtime issue in this paper by assuming U
is a discrete set small enough to calculate this optimization in real time. The final
implementation is in a neural network where a single forward pass through a network
can calculate many values for K(x) in parallel as discussed for instance in [75].
6.2 Generating a Model Free Barrier Function via Evasive Maneuvers
6.2.1 Constructing Barrier Functions For Discrete Time Systems
Prior chapters have demonstrated a method for constructing a barrier function for
continuous time systems. We therefore first adapt that method to discrete time. Let
ρ : Rn → R be a safety function that must be nonnegative at all times for the system
to be safe. Let γ : Rn → U be an evasive maneuver that can keep the system safe.
Note that γ is not necessarily the safety override but is instead used to construct
a barrier function. To construct a candidate DT-ECBF we forward propagate the
state using γ as the controller and calculate the worst case safety value using ρ for





be a candidate DT-ECBF where x̂0 = x0 and x̂k for k > 0 is the future state when
using γ for all future time, namely
x̂k+1 = f(x̂k, γ(x̂k)). (6.7)
Using this formulation, we can show that h in (6.6) is a DT-ECBF. The theorem
and proof are similar to Theorem 2 but applied to discrete time systems.
Theorem 7. Given a dynamical system (6.1) and a function h defined in (6.6) with a
safety function ρ and an evasive maneuver γ, h is a DT-ECBF on the set C.
Proof. Suppose x ∈ C so that h(x) ≥ 0. Then





The right hand side is nonnegative because it is the subtraction of the infimum of
same function on different intervals where the first interval is a subset of the second
interval. Then ∆h(x, γ(x)) ≥ 0. Recalling as well that x ∈ C means that h(x) ≥ 0,
this implies that ∆h(x, γ(x))+λh(x) ≥ 0. Then γ(x) ∈ K(x) so h is a DT-ECBF.
Remark 16. Although in Definition 4 D can be a larger set than C, Theorem 7 is only
valid for C = D. See Theorem 2 for sufficient conditions for C ⊂ D in the continuous
time domain.
6.2.2 The Effect of The Evasive Maneuver on Safe Sets
While Theorem 7 shows that h defined in (6.6) is a DT-ECBF and can therefore be
used to guarantee safety, it does not explicitly imply anything about the topology
of the safe set C that is implied by h. In particular, for different choices of γ, the
associated safe set can be drastically different.
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Consider the two examples of a barrier function discussed in Section 2.3.2, namely
hturn and hstraight as the h in (6.6) constructed from γturn and γstraight, respectively.
The reason these evasive maneuvers were considered previously is because they enable
a closed form solution to (6.6) so that the barrier function constraint can be calculated
in real-time. We consider some examples where the safe set implied by hturn and
hstraight results in either an unnecessary invasive override or labeling states as unsafe
that have ample room to avoid a collision. A graphical view of these two scenarios is
in Figure 6.1. The actual path traversed by the vehicles for the scenario of Figure 6.1b
is demonstrated in Figure 6.2.
Example 7. States Are Labelled Unsafe Where Collisions Can Be Avoided. Suppose
h is parameterized by γstraight and consider an initial condition where the two vehicles
are positioned at the same altitude with orientations pointing at each other. Then
no matter how far apart the vehicles start, the calculation of (6.6) yields h = −Ds,
implying that the initial conditions are not safe. This is because using γstraight as the
evasive maneuver implies that the two vehicles will continue on a collision course until
they collide. Clearly, as the vehicles are placed arbitrarily far apart, there is ample
time to turn to avoid a collision. Nevertheless, according to hstraight, this configuration
is outside of the safe set.
Example 8. An Unnecessary Invasive Override. While using hturn resolves the issue
raised in Example 7, there are other initial conditions that lead to an unnecessary
override even when using γturn. For instance, suppose that the vehicles pass on the
left of each other with a lateral separation of more than the safety distance but less
than four turn radii. Then if the vehicles continue straight the vehicles will eventually
approach an unsafe condition according to hturn and the overriding safety controller
will induce a large path correction so that each vehicle can pass on the others’ left.
Examples 7 and 8 indicate hstraight and hturn may be restrictive. Another way of




Figure 6.1: (a) When the two vehicles are pointing towards each other, the vehicles
are not safe when using hstraight no matter how far apart the vehicles start from each
other. (b) When the vehicles pass to each others’ left, the vehicles are not in the safe
set when using hturn because the evasive maneuver implies the vehicles would collide
with each other. The practical takeaway in these two cases is that even though safety
can be guaranteed, the particular states that are safe may be different. In either case
though, collision avoidance can be achieved provided the vehicles start in a state such
that h(x) ≥ 0 for either hstraight or hturn.
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Figure 6.2: A plot of the trajectory of vehicle 2. When using γstraight to construct the
barrier function, vehicle 2 does not deviate from the nominal control value. When
using γturn, vehicle 2 deviates significantly. This is because the barrier function always
makes sure that vehicle 2 can execute γturn to keep the vehicles safe even if there are
better selections for an overriding controller (e.g., in this case, continuing straight).
The trajectory for vehicle 1 is similar.
as is done in Figure 6.3. Figure 6.3 demonstrates that even when the vehicles are
not pointing at each other, the vehicles can be spaced far apart and be in an unsafe
state when using γstraight as the evasive maneuver. Further, Figure 6.3a even shows
that the vehicles can be considered unsafe even when they have flown past each
other when using hturn. The point of these examples is that there are cases where
a barrier function can induce overly restrictive safety overrides. We note that while
these two examples demonstrate that a safety override using barrier functions may
result in overly restrictive behavior this is not necessarily the case for all barrier
functions. In particular, this chapter resolves these issues by finding a barrier function
whose safe set is much larger than the safe set associated with either hturn or hstraight
(see Fig. 6.5). It also shows using a maximum of barrier functions can increase the
admissible control space.
6.2.3 An Initial Model Free Barrier Function
The issues in Figures 6.1 and 6.3 result because the evasive maneuvers used to calcu-




Figure 6.3: A plot of the unsafe set for four different configurations of the aircraft
when using hstraight (blue) or hturn (orange). In all cases one of the vehicles is at
the origin with orientation pointing along the positive x-axis. The plot shows when
the set of states that are outside the safe set as the second vehicle changes x and
y positions. In particular, it shows that some states are needlessly labelled unsafe.
An example is in (a) where hturn labels states as unsafe even when the vehicles have
flown past each other. (a) The second vehicle is pointing left. (b) The second vehicle
is pointing up. (c) The second vehicle is pointing right, (d) The second vehicle is
pointing down.
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turning right when the other vehicle is on the left and turning left when the other
vehicle is on the right. More generally, we might expect that the evasive maneuver
use the state to select an evasive maneuver which is not the case for γstraight and γturn.
In this section we present a solution to this problem.
Another consideration not discussed in Section 6.2.2 for using Theorem 7 is that
it requires that (6.6) be calculated over an infinite horizon. Nevertheless, as demon-
strated in Section 2.3.2, h can be calculated in closed form for γturn and γstraight.
To do so, we assumed a particular model and chose an evading maneuver to enable
closed form calculations. However, as shown in Section 6.2.2, this may result in safe
sets that exclude many seemingly safe states.
More generally, it may be difficult to generate a barrier function if the system
dynamics are complicated. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in Theorem 7, the evasive
maneuver can be any function that maps from the state to the action space.
Because it may be difficult to calculate h in (6.6) in closed form for an arbitrary γ,
we propose taking a data driven approach. To do so, we can start the state at some
x0 ∈ Rn and apply some evasive maneuver γ that we specify.1 Because the nominal
controller is available, we could for instance let γ = û and create a sequence {xk}Tk=0
where T is some horizon over which safety is evaluated. In the case of UAV collision
avoidance, T may represent battery life of the vehicles where collisions will obviously
not occur beyond time T .
Note that the sequence {xk}Tk=0 is the enumeration of the minimum on the right
hand side of (6.6). Thus, given a starting state x0, we can calculate ρmin = mink≥0 ρ(xk)
to calculate a sample h(x0). Suppose this process is repeated N times to form a
dataset D = {(xj0, ρ
j
min)}Nj=1. Then we can fit a function ĥ to approximate the map-
ping (6.6) with the dataset D. In the perfect case where there is no error in ĥ we are
1Note that x0 is sampled from Rn rather than D so that during the data-generation phase, the
vehicles may start in an unsafe condition. This is to provide more data in fitting the learned ĥ.
If the data did not include unsafe states then the data would have a bias towards predicting that
states are safe.
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left with a function that directly calculates (6.6) without having to do the integration
in (6.6) because the integration is implicit in the fitting of the data.
However, when fitting ĥ there will be errors. Errors where the learned ĥ is less
than the true h leads to more conservative behavior by considering states to be unsafe
that are actually safe. On the other hand, when the learned ĥ over predicts relative
to the data, it can imply the state is safe when it is not. A conservative approach is
to therefore bias the learned ĥ downward to reflect uncertainty. This can be done by
biasing the loss function as was done in [76] or alternatively with a Bayesian approach
(e.g., Gaussian Processes [77] were used for barrier functions in [78]. Bayesian neural
networks [79, 80] can also output an uncertainty) by subtracting a desired number of
standard deviations learned model output. We note though that while this method
reduces the chances that the fitted ĥ will over predict the true h, because it cannot
be guaranteed this type of error does not occur, the strict safety guarantee arising
from of Theorem 7 is lost.
6.2.4 Iteratively Expanding the Admissible Control Space
Consider the output of ĥ when applied to fixed wing collision avoidance with a way-
point finding nominal controller. Position two vehicles arbitrarily far apart with way-
points located at the starting position of the other vehicle, and orientations pointing
at their respective waypoint. This configuration will be unsafe for ĥ for the same rea-
son as described in Example 7. We now show how to improve on this initial estimated
ĥ with an iterative algorithm.
We therefore examine the case where a barrier function h is available and seek to
generate a new barrier function h1 with a larger safe set than h. Given a state x0 ∈ Rn
and a nominal control value û, let γ1 : Rn → U be the result of the optimization2
in equation (6.5). We note that the function γ1 can be used as an evasive maneuver
2Note that because x0 is sampled from Rn rather than D it is not guaranteed that the optimization
program has a solution when x /∈ D. This can be resolved for instance by adding a slack variable.
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since it is a function that maps to the action space as required by Theorem 7. In





x̂k+1 = f(x̂k, γ
1(x̂k)). (6.9)
We denote the safe set of h1 as C1.
Theorem 8. Given a dynamical system (6.1) let h be defined in (6.6) with safety
function ρ and evasive maneuver γ. Let h1 be defined in (6.8) with safety function ρ
and evasive maneuver γ1 defined as the output of (6.5). Then C ⊆ C1.
Proof. Let x0 ∈ C. From Proposition 7, because γ1 maps to values in K(x) for all
x ∈ D, ρ(x̂k) ≥ 0 for k ≥ 0 where x̂k is defined in (6.9). Then h1(x0) ≥ 0. Then
x0 ∈ C1.
Theorem 8 says that by using γ1 rather than γ as the evasive maneuver, the safe
set does not get smaller. We now show a case where C is a strict subset of C1.








where xk,1 is the position and xk,2 is the velocity. Let ρ(xk) = xk,1 so that the system





. Then h(x0) = −0.05 so x /∈ C. In the case where û = 2 ∈ U , the
result of (6.5) is γ1(x) = 2. Then using γ1 to construct h1 via (6.8), h1(x0) = 0.2 so
x0 ∈ C1.
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The point of Example 9 is that γ1 can in some cases do a better job at avoiding
unsafe conditions and as a result the safety set is enlarged. However, as discussed in
Section 6.2.3, there is a drawback to using γ1. In particular, to apply Theorem 8,
one then needs to forward propagate the dynamics (6.9) for all future time where
the controller at every future timestep is the result of a nonconvex program (6.5)
and return the minimum ρ(xk) for the resulting sequence {x̂k}Tk=0. For online safety
overrides, this is not computationally feasible. Thus, we pursue the data driven
approach discussed in Section 6.2.3. The algorithm is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Initial algorithm for learning a model free barrier function.
input : h (barrier function), N (number of samples), û (nominal controller),
T (safety horizon)
output: ĥ1
1 Function ExpandSafeSet(h, ρ, N , T ):
2 D = {};
3 for m← 1 to N do
4 select a random x0;
5 x← x0;
6 ρmin ← ρ(x);
7 for j ← 1 to T do
8 γ1 ← from equation (6.5) using x, h, and û;
9 x← f(x, γ1);
10 ρmin ← min(ρmin, ρ(x));
11 end
12 append {x0, ρmin} to D;
13 end
14 ĥ1 ←fit to D;
15 return ĥ1;
Given Theorem 8 and Example 9 and that there are no errors in fitting ĥ1 to to
h1, we expect that C1 will be a superset of C. However, notice that we can continue
this process to form γ2 with the property that γ2(x) ∈ K1(x) for all x ∈ C1 where
K1(x) = {u ∈ U : ∆ĥ1(x) + γĥ1(x) ≥ 0}. (6.11)
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This approach is summarized in Algorithm 2. In general, for a barrier function hi we
denote the admissible control space by Ki and the safe set by Ci.
Algorithm 2: Algorithm for Iteratively Expanding the Safe Set
input : h (barrier function), N (number of samples), û (nominal controller),
T (safety horizon), L (number of expansions)
output: ĥL
1 ĥ0 ← h;
2 for i← 1 to L do
3 ĥi ←ExpandSafeSet(ĥi−1, ρ, N , û, T );
4 end
However, Algorithm 2 ignores a subtle issue, namely that it is not necessarily the
case that Kj(x) ⊆ Ki(x) for any i > j even though Theorem 8 shows that Cj ⊆ Ci.
This is demonstrated in the following example.
Example 10. Consider again the double integrator system in Example 9. Let x0 =[
2 −1
]
, γ(x) = 0.5, and λ = 0.9. Then a numerical calculation shows that K(x0) =
{u : u ≥ −3.77}. Let
û(x) =

1 x0,0 = 2 and x0,1 = −1
0.5 otherwise
.
Then K1(x0) = {u : u ≥ −3.67}. In other words, even though Theorem 8 shows
that C ⊆ C1, it is not the case that K(x) ⊆ K1(x).
Example 10 shows that even though the safe set is enlarged when using Algo-
rithm 2, the set of controls available to keep the system safe may be reduced. This
means that in some places of the safe set there may be a more aggressive safety over-
ride when using h1 rather than h. For this reason we would like to use the maximum
of the barrier functions hj for j ≤ i in Algorithm 2. We note that the use of maxi-
mums for boolean composition of barrier functions for continuous time systems was
previously analyzed in [55].
101
Theorem 9. Given a dynamical system (6.1) and DT-ECBFs h1 and h2, the function
h3 defined by h3(x) = max(h1(x), h2(x)) is a DT-ECBF on the set C1 ∪ C2. Further,
K1(x) ⊆ K3(x) on the set C1 and K2(x) ⊆ K3(x) on the set C2.
Proof. We first prove that h3 is a DT-ECBF on C1 ∪ C2. Suppose x ∈ C1 ∪ C2 and
without loss of generality, assume h1(x) ≥ h2(x) so h3(x) = h1(x). Suppose u ∈ U
satisfies ∆h1(x, u) + λh1(x) ≥ 0 and let x1 = f(x, u). Such a u exists because h1 is a
DT-ECBF. Then





2(x1))− h1(x) + λh1(x). (6.12)
Case 1: If h1(x1) ≥ h2(x1) then (6.12) becomes
∆h3(x, u) + λh3(x) = ∆h1(x, u) + λh1(x) ≥ 0.
Case 2: If h1(x1) < h2(x1) then (6.12) becomes
∆h3(x, u) + λh3(x) = h2(x1)− h1(x) + λh1(x)
≥ h1(x1)− h1(x) + λh1(x)
= ∆h1(x, u) + λh1(x) ≥ 0.
Then h3 is a DT-ECBF.
Note that this also establishes that K1(x) ⊆ K3(x) on the set C1 under the
condition that h1(x) ≥ h2(x). We now consider the case where x ∈ C1 and h1(x) <
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h2(x) to show that K1(x) ⊆ K3(x) on the set C1. When h1(x) < h2(x) we have
∆h3(x, u) + λh3(x)
= [max(h1(x1), h
2(x1))]− h2(x) + λh2(x)
≥ [max(h1(x1), h2(x1))]− h1(x) + λh1(x).
Continuing the same logic as cases 1 and 2 above we conclude K1(x) ⊆ K3(x) on the
set C1 under the condition that h1(x) < h2(x). Then K1(x) ⊆ K2(x) on C1. The case
of K2(x) ⊆ K3(x) on C2 is proven the same way.
Remark 17. The optimization (6.5) is non-convex so finding an online solution may
be computationally intensive. A direct solution to this is to assume U is a small
finite set and allow the calculation to be done in a single forward pass of a neural
network. However, an alternative occurs when h1 is defined via (6.6) for some γ and
x ∈ C1. Theorem 7 demonstrates that γ is always a feasible solution of (6.5) provided
h1(x) ≥ 0 (and similarly for an evasive maneuver used to construct h2 for x ∈ C2).
Because K1(x) ⊆ K3(x) for all x ∈ C1, this means that γ is a feasible solution for
(6.5) when using h3 and x ∈ C1.
Theorem 9 provides the justification for adjusting Algorithm 2 to use a maximum
so that the safety set is enlarged as well as the admissible control space. However, the
direct application of Theorem 9 implies that L barrier functions must be maintained,
which implies memory growth and reduces online computation capability. For this
reason, we elect to adjust the dataset accordingly in Algorithm 3. Note that the
difference between the functions ExpandSafeSet and ExpandSafeSetWithMax occurs
in line 18 in Algorithm 3 where the max is used.
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Algorithm 3: Algorithm for Iteratively Expanding the Safe Set and the Ad-
missible Control Space
input : h (barrier function), N (number of samples), û (nominal controller),
T (safety horizon), L (number of expansions)
output: ĥL
1 ĥ0 ← h;
2 for i← 1 to L do
3 ĥi ←ExpandSafeSetWithMax(hi−1, ρ, N , T );
4 end
5 Function ExpandSafeSetWithMax(h, ρ, N , û, T ):
6 D = {};
7 for m← 1 to N do
8 select a random x0;
9 x← x0;
10 ρmin ← ρ(x);
11 for j ← 1 to T do
12 γ1 ← from equation (6.5) using x, h, and û;
13 ;
14 x← f(x, γ1) ;
15 ρmin ← min(ρmin, ρ(x));
16 end
17 end
18 append {x0,max(h(x0), ρmin)} to D;
19 ĥ1 ←fit to D;
20 return ĥ1;
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6.2.5 Model Free Barrier Functions
While hL in Algorithm 3 may appear to be model-free, a model is still required to
select γ1(x) in line 12 because K(x) requires a calculation of ∆h(x) which requires
a model for the dynamics. Thus, to make the final result of Algorithm 3 model-free
we must also create a learned function ∆ĥ. To do so, we simply record the minimum
ρ(x) occurring after j = 1 in Algorithm 3.
6.3 SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
In this section we validate the approach of Algorithm 3. We let v1 = v2 = 15
meters/second in equation (2.15) and restrict the action space of both agents to
a selection of [−12, 0, 12] degrees per second for ω while holding velocity fixed at
15 meters per second and altitude rate at 0. The initial state for each vehicle
is between
[




200 200 π 0
]T
. We also let ρ(x) =
max(50,
√
d1,2(x)−Ds). We use a ρ that is clipped at 50 rather than just
√
d1,2(x)−Ds
to simplify data normalization so that the target values are not unbounded and note
that this clipping does not change C. Hyperparameters are listed in Table 6.1 and
training statistics are plotted in Figure 6.4.
Similar to Figure 6.3, we plot in Figure 6.5 the safe set for the mean value of the
model free barrier function as well as when three standard deviations are subtracted.
When subtracting three standard deviations from the mean output of the model-free
barrier function, the unsafe set is enlarged. We also plot how the unsafe set changes
as the ExpandWithMax in Figure 6.6 to demonstrate that the safe set is enlarged as
the algorithm proceeds.
We list the percentage of collisions at each training iteration in Table 6.2. Given
the model-free barrier function at the given iteration we show what percentage of
episodes the vehicles come within 25 meters of each other when the barrier function
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Num Samples for Stdev Calculation 50
Number of Fully Connected Layers 4
Width Per Layer 1024
Table 6.2: The percentage of episodes where the vehicles collide from random initial
conditions when the initial state is safe according to the barrier function versus the
scenario where only the nominal controller is used. Notice that safety is significantly
improved when using a model-based barrier function but that safety is nevertheless
not guaranteed as there is noise in fitting to the data.






value of the first state is nonnegative. Notice that the number of collisions when using
a model free barrier function is less than 10% of the number of collisions when using
no barrier function. Additionally note that there are not zero collisions when using
a model-free barrier function as there is noise in fitting to the data. Nevertheless,
safety is significantly improved over using the nominal controller alone.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have discussed a few issues with model based barrier functions,
namely that barrier functions may label safe states as unsafe (Example 7), barrier
functions may cause unnecessary overrides that cause the state to get closer to the
boundary of the safe set than without an override (Example 8), for complex systems it
may be difficult to solve for a barrier function in closed form (hturn and hstraight exist
due to closed form solutions but lead to large unsafe sets, see Fig. 6.5), and it can
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Figure 6.4: Training data when fitting a model-free barrier function. (a) The val-
idation error of the model-free network, (b) The standard deviation output by the
network, and (c) How often the network outputs a value that is higher than the true




Figure 6.5: A plot of the unsafe set for the four different configurations of Fig. 6.3
for model based and a model free method. The model free method shows the mean
output of a neural network as well as the case where we subtract three standard
deviations from the mean. Note that the safe set for the mean output of the model
free-barrier function is a subset of the model free unsafe sets. When subtracting
3 standard deviations from the model-free barrier function the unsafe set is larger
than when using the mean. The data for fitting the model-free barrier function was
sampled from positions (-200, -200) to (200, 200) so out-of-sample points are often
labelled as unsafe due to the higher data uncertainty of those states. (a) The second
vehicle is pointing left. (b) The second vehicle is pointing up. (c) The second vehicle




Figure 6.6: A plot of the unsafe set for the four different configurations of Fig. 6.3
for comparing early vs later iterations of the model free barrier functions. A plot
demonstrating that the safe set grows as the algorithm proceeds. Note that on unsafe
set of the barrier function at iteration 5 is a subset of the unsafe set at iteration 1,
as predicted by Theorem 9. (a) The second vehicle is pointing left. (b) The second
vehicle is pointing up. (c) The second vehicle is pointing right, (d) The second vehicle
is pointing down.
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Table 6.3: The effect assumptions have on safety when using barrier functions.
Assumption Effect of Removing Assumption
One Safety Constraint still safe but additional assumption required (shared
evading maneuver)
Unlimited Communication still safe but overriding control value may deviate
more significantly from nominal control value
Infinite Range Sensors only some barrier functions can be used to guarantee
safety and the state may approach the safety bound-
ary more quickly than with unlimited sensing
Known Dynamics Model less invasive safety override but loss of safety guaran-
tee
be numerically infeasible to solve for a barrier function when there is a long horizon
(see equation (6.6)). To resolve these problems, we introduced model-free barrier
functions which take a data-driven approach to developing a barrier function. The
tradeoff is that because the barrier function cannot perfectly fit to the data, safety
guarantees are lost but the benefit is that the safety set may be significantly enlarged
(Fig. 6.5). Further, the optimization required to solve for a safe control input can be
done in a single forward pass through a neural network. We demonstrated the efficacy
of the approach in a fixed-wing aircraft collision avoidance scenario where, because
of the model free barrier function, the safety of the system is significantly improved




In this thesis we have shown how to construct a minimally invasive framework to
ensure safety while getting as much performance out of the system for arbitrarily
many agents even with limited communication and sensing. In particular, the main
contributions as as follows:
• Generalize a Method for Constructing a Barrier Function [63] - Given an evasive
maneuver and a safety function that must be non-negative at all times for the
system to be safe we construct a barrier function by forward propagating the
dynamics using the evasive maneuver and calculate the smallest value along
that trajectory to calculate a barrier function.
• Safety Composition [81] - We give sufficient conditions for multiple safety ob-
jectives to be satisfied for all future time.
• Limited Communication Safety [81] - We relax the assumption that each agent
has knowledge of the other’s control value and show that safety guarantees can
still be made.
• Safety With Limited Range Sensing [67] - We give sufficient conditions to con-
struct a barrier function in the context of limited range sensing that can be
used to ensure the system stays safe for all times.
• Model Free Safety - We discuss limitations of model based barrier functions and
introduce model free barrier functions to reduce the invasiveness of the safety
override.
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We demonstrate the contributions to barrier functions in a scenario of twenty
fixed-wing aircraft whose nominal trajectories are designed to cause a collision but






AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF δ IN THE CONTINUOUS
DIFFERENTIABILITY OF HTURN
Note that (2.12) is not necessarily differentiable when A2 = 0 since A2 results from
a square root performed in phasor addition. Thus, in this section, we consider how
to ensure A2 is continuously differentiable to ensure h in (2.12) is continuously dif-
ferentiable. Consider (2.12) in phasor form




= A1 −D2s + A5ejΘ5 + A6ejΘ6 (A.1)
where A3 = 2∆b0r, A4 = 2∆c0r, A5ejΘ5 = σA3ej(θ1,0−π/2)+A3ej(θ2,0+π/2)+δej(θ1,0−π/2),
and A6ejΘ6 = σA4ej(θ1,0−π) + A4ejθ2,0 + δej(θ1,0−π). Notice that Θ5 − Θ6 = π/2. In
other words, A2 is zero only when both A5 and A6 are zero. For δ = 0, A5 and A6
are both zero on the set Z1 ⊆ D where θ1,0 = θ2,0 or θ1,0 = θ2,0 + π. Although Z1 is a
zero measure set, we note that for δ > 0 that A2 is zero on a set Z2 ⊂ Z1 where Z2
is the restriction of Z1 to a specific set of positions which we now specify.
Case 1. Vehicles Start in Opposite Directions. Suppose θ1,0 = θ2,0 + π. Then A5 = 0
when δ = −(1 + σ)A3 = −2(1 + σ)∆b0r. Similarly, A6 = 0 when δ = −(1 + σ)A4 =
−2(1 + σ)∆c0r. Suppose δ is fixed. Then A2 = 0 when − δ2(1+σ)r = ∆b0 = p1,x0 −
p2,x0 + r(1 + σ) sin θ2,0 and − δ2(1+σ)r = ∆c0 = p1,y0 − p2,y0 − r(1 + σ) cos θ2,0.
Case 2. Vehicles Start in the Same Direction. Suppose θ1,0 = θ2,0. Then A5 = 0 when
δ = (1− σ)A3. Similarly, A6 = 0 when δ = (1− σ)A4. For σ = 1, let δ > 0 to ensure
A5 and A6 are not simultaneously 0. For 0 < σ < 1, a similar analysis to the previous
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case implies A2 = 0 when when − δ2(1−σ)r = ∆b0 = p1,x0 + p2,x0 − r(1− σ) sin θ2,0 and
− δ
2(1+σ)r
= ∆c0 = p1,y0 − p2,y0 − r(1 + σ) cos θ2,0.
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APPENDIX B
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONTINUOUS DIFFERENTIABILITY OF HSTRAIGHT
From (2.16) we expand terms to get
h(x) = inf
τ∈[0,∞)
c(x) + b(x)τ + a(x)τ 2 (B.1)
where c(x) = ∆x2+∆y2+∆z2−D2s , b(x) = 2(∆x∆C+∆y∆S), a(x) = ∆C2+∆S2,
∆x = p1,x0 − p2,x0 , ∆y = p1,y0 − p2,y0 , ∆z = p1,z0 − p2,z0 , ∆C = v1 cos θ1 − v2 cos θ2,
∆S = v1 sin θ1 − v2 sin θ2. We also note that a(x) > 0 since
a(x) = (v1 cos θ1 − v2 cos θ2)2 + (v1 sin θ1 − v2 sin θ2)2
= v21 + v
2
2 − 2v1v2 cos(θ1 − θ2)
= v21 + v
2
2 − 2v1v2 + 2v1v2 − 2v1v2 cos(θ1 − θ2)
= (v1 − v2)2 + 2v1v2(1− cos(θ1 − θ2))
> 0
since v1 ̸= v2 and v1 and v2 are positive. Then τmin(x) = −b(x)/2a(x) is well defined.
Then h has a minimum at τnonneg,min = max(0, τmin(x)).
For τnonneg,min(x) > 0, h is continuously differentiable because c, b, τmin, and a are





for either the case of τmin = 0 or τmin = −b(x)/2a(x). In the first case,



























because in this case b(x) and τmin(x) are 0.
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